Long-run Connections in the Distribution of Income

Capital Shares and Income Inequality: Evidence from the Long Run

by Erik Bengtsson (Lund) and Daniel Waldenström (Paris School of Economics and CEPR)

Abstract – This article studies the long-run relationship between the capital share in national income and top personal income shares. Using a newly constructed historical cross-country database on capital shares and top income data, we find evidence on a strong, positive link that has grown stronger over the past century. The connection is stronger in Anglo-Saxon countries, in the very top of the distribution, when top capital incomes predominate, when using distributed top national income shares, and when considering gross of depreciation capital shares. Out of-sample predictions of top shares using capital shares indicates several cases of over- or underestimation.

Freely available for a limited time at: The Journal of Economic History, 78(3): 712-743
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050718000347

Review by Leandro Prados de la Escosura (Universidad Carlos III, Groningen, and CEPR)

Until recently, many academic economists would react sceptically to the idea of income inequality. It is absolute poverty what matters, they would argue, and sustained growth is the answer. It would be misled, however, to conclude the only lately has inequality become part of the economists’ agenda. Actually inequality has always been present in economists’ preoccupations. Its symptoms have varied, as social sensitivity to inequality has changed over time. Classical economists identified personal income distribution with the functional income distribution as inequality largely depended on the gap between average incomes of capital and labour. This is clearly exposed in David Ricardo’s famous passage in which he noted that the explaining the distribution of “the produce of earth (…) among (…) the proprietor of the land, the owner of the stock or capital (…) and the labourers” is the main purpose of political economy. In the early 20th century, as the share of skilled workers in the labour force was increasing, Simon Kuznets noted the dispersion of labour incomes and highlighted its role as a driving force of income inequality. At the turn of the century, the increase in the concentration of income at the top of the distribution has renewed the concern about inequality as the contributions of the late Sir Tony Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, and their collaborators evidence. It is in this context where Eric Bengtsson and Daniel Waldeström’s important contribution should be read.

The purpose of Bengtsson and Waldeström was to the test the existence of a long run connection between the functional and the personal distribution of income. As economic historians they find no reason to assume the relationship would be stable over time and across countries since many other dimensions (technology, institutions, personal incomes composition, …) will impinge on it.

Their analytical framework is the decomposition of income inequality, using the coefficient of variation, into wages and capital income dispersion, factor shares, and the correlation between capital and labour income, from which a link between capital share and income inequality is predicated. More specifically, a positive association between the two metrics is hypothesised: as capital returns are more unevenly distributed than those accruing to labour, a rise in the share of capital in national income would result in an increase in personal income inequality.

Once their hypothesis is defined, they deal with the data. On the basis of capital returns and GDP, mostly derived from previous scholarly work, they put together a reasonably homogeneous dataset on capital shares, that is, the ratio of capital incomes (interest, profits, dividends, and realized capital gains) to national income for 21 countries (mostly present-day OECD countries) since 1900. Capital returns are computed form the income side of historical national accounts, which raises the challenge of how to distribute mixed incomes (those of self-employed) between capital and labour. The so called labour method that attributed to the self-employed a labour income equal to that of the average employee in each specific sector of economic activity is the usual approach. Then, they choose income concentration at the top of the distribution as a measure of personal income distribution, since alternative metrics such as the Gini coefficient are not available on yearly basis for their country sample and time span. The dataset on the share of income accruing to the 10, 1, and 0.1 top per cent derives from the World Inequality Database (https://wid.world/wid-world/).

The approach to test the association between personal and functional income distribution is panel regression analysis, in which a log-linear relationship is predicated between top income shares, as dependent variable, and the net (gross) capital share, so the latter’s parameter represents the elasticity of income concentration (inequality) with respect to the capital share. In addition to the baseline equation, they also compute more complex models which include control variables (level of development, proxied by GDP per head; structural change, by the agricultural labour share; relevance of private capital by stock marker capitalisation; and size of the public sector, by the government spending to GDP ratio) country fixed effects, and a linear time trend. The overall view of all countries over the 20th century is complemented by a breakdown by epoch (pre World War II, 1950-80, and 1980-2015) and type of countries (three clubs, the Anglo-Saxon, the Scandinavian, the Western European).

Their main finding is a robust association between top income shares and capital shares over the long run, that results in a high elasticity of income inequality with respect to the capital share that declines when specific periods (1950-1980 and 1980-2015) are considered. Thus, a 10 per cent rise in the net capital share is corresponded by an almost similar increase in income concentration at the top. It is worth noting, however, the lower elasticity –and statistical significance- found for the pre-World War II era. When more complex models, including covariates, are used the fit of the regressions increases but reduces the coefficient for the capital share that, nonetheless, still holds up. The association becomes stronger as top incomes shares are restricted to the 0.1 per cent and a possible explanation is that these mainly correspond to capital earners.

The authors also explore the extent to which capital incomes at the top of the distribution account for the association between top income shares and the capital share. They confirm previous findings suggesting that capital incomes predominate in the incomes of the top earners and increase within the income top. However, the authors find that high-paid salaried employees have been replacing capital earners at the very top of the distribution. In any case, the association between top income share and the capital share is stronger when capital rather than wage or total top incomes are considered.

1913: The wealthy man profits from the sweat of the worker. The cartoon is titled ‘The Reflection’ and the capitalist exclaims ‘I’m a self-made man, look at me’. (Photo by Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

The paper concludes with the authors addressing the crux of the matter, is the capital share a good predictor of inequality? In order to do it, they re-run panel regressions leaving aside the country whose inequality is to be predicted. The results are positive in general, but the authors acknowledge that capital shares are not perfect predictors of concentration at the top of the distribution, to which one may add that top income shares are neither a precise measure of personal income inequality.
This thought-provoking paper raises some reflections. Would not it more intuitive the framework proposed by Milanovic (2005) than the authors’ breakdown of the coefficient of variation? Milanovic decomposes inequality into between-group and within-group inequality. In a similar scenario, with only two groups: proprietors, to whom capital (and land) incomes accrue, and workers who receive the returns to labour, personal income inequality results from both the gap between average incomes of capital and labour (that is, a metric that captures the functional distribution of income) and the dispersion of incomes within both capital owners and workers.

A reference to top income shares shortcomings is missing. Uncritically assuming it is a good proxy of personal income distribution neglects that fact that although top income share satisfies axioms of income scale independence, principle of population, and anonymity only weakly does the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. Moreover, it is silent on how inequality evolves at the bottom of the distribution.

Some of the results could have been explored more. For example, their finding of a lower elasticity of income inequality with respect to the capital share in the pre-World War II era (that is also found when the Ginis is used as dependent variable) deserves further examination. On the one hand, it seems at odds with the inference of a much higher association between income inequality and the capital share in earlier phases of economic development, as between-group inequality (the average capital incomes to labour incomes ratio) has a larger weight in total personal inequality (the dispersion of capital and labour incomes is presumably lower). On the other, a potential explanation would be the increasing dispersion of factor returns –wages, in particular- in the early 20th century, a finding consistent with Kuznets’ focus on the rise of skilled labour and rural-urban migration.

Another neglected issue (somehow a paradox given the authors’ background) is why income concentration at the top and the net capital share are not associated in the Nordic countries since 1980.

The avenues for research the paper opens deserved more detailed consideration. It is true that in the last section the authors address the issue of how good a prediction of personal inequality the capital share is. However, an obvious extension would be to use the capital share as a proxy for income inequality prior to the early 20th century, when hardly any data on top income shares are available and other measures of inequality such as the Gini are rare.

The paper is worth reading as it represents an ambitious and successful project to deal with income inequality over space and time. Moreover, a most valuable online appendix that complements the freely accessible dataset provided by the authors’ webpage accompanies the paper.

References

Milanovic, B. (2005), Worlds Apart: Measuring International and Global Inequality, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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Reconstructing the B-School

Clio in the Business School: Historical Approaches in Strategy, International Business and Entrepreneurship

by Andrew Perchard (Stirling), Niall Mackenzie (Strathclyde), Stephanie Decker (Aston) and Giovanni Favero (Venice)

On the back of recent and significant new debates on the use of history within business and management studies, we consider the perception of historians as being anti-theory and of having methodological shortcomings; and business and management scholars displaying insufficient attention to historical context and privileging of certain social science methods over others. These are explored through an examination of three subjects: strategy, international business and entrepreneurship. We propose a framework for advancing the use of history within business and management studies more generally through greater understanding of historical perspectives and methodologies.

Keywords: History, strategy, international business, entrepreneurship, methodology

Freely available for a limited time at: Business History, 59(6): 904-27

Review by Mitchell J. Larson (University of Central Lancashire)

Recently Martin Parker (Bristol) has taken to the airwaves promoting the idea of bulldozing the business school. In sharp contrast, Andrew Perchard, Niall McKenzie, Stephanie Decker, and Giovanni Favero make a compelling case for certain disciplines in the management sciences to open themselves to alternative methodological and epistemological approaches. They argue that the fields of strategy, international business, and entrepreneurship have not embraced historically-oriented research to the same extent as other fields within business and management studies. The authors also admit that many scholars conducting historical business research have not made a sufficiently solid case about the robustness of their historical methodology(s) or data to convince other social scientists about the validity of their claims. Drawing upon an impressive range of previous works to develop their discussion, the paper attempts to reconcile these discrepancies to highlight how a more explicit articulation of the historian’s process could overcome the concerns of ‘mainstream’ management scholars regarding theorization and methodology in these three fields specifically and in management studies generally.

One major concern held by non-historians is that historical work illustrates an alleged a-theoretical or even anti-theoretical nature of scholarly writing (Duara, 1998). A second major concern is that historical methods (i.e. of data collection) are not sufficient grounds upon which to base management theory. The authors demonstrate the complexities of these issues with respect to existing historical work in business and management studies, such as the ‘cherry-picking’ of outlier events to support a more general point – especially by scholars in other fields applying historical methods rather casually – and place responsibility upon business and management historians to make their process(es) more transparent and explain themselves and their work better to other social scientists. The article claims that the “continuing distinctions drawn between the primary data created by social science research…with the collection of ‘secondary’ documentary evidence in archives…are misleading.” (p. 915). Whereas social science researchers will be aware explicitly about potential sources for bias in their data and often include discussions about this in their work, the historical process ‘internalizes’ these judgements and thus appears to hide them from the reader. The discipline of history, so accustomed to the individual historian’s assessment of the materials being examined, assumes that with satisfactory preparation the historian’s assessment will be reasonable based on her (or his) knowledge of the historical context, the actors involved, and assumptions about the rationality and practicality of the various decisions that might have been made at any particular point in the timeline. But it is this internalization of decision-making and assessment which so troubles non-historians and why the authors call for business and management historians to “more clearly articulate the methodologies adopted by historians to show the value of history to business and management studies…” That there is value to be realized is shown through the acceptance of historical approaches by other branches of the management studies arena, and their point is that these three sub-fields have been slower to warm to their use than others.

The major difficulty here lies in the way data are encountered: the social scientist generates new ‘primary’ data through his or her interaction with respondents whether actively (through interviews or questionnaires) or passively (through observation). Given the nature of historical work, of course this style of primary data generation is seldom possible: all the protagonists are gone and even the organization(s) to which they were affiliated may have disappeared or transformed beyond anything the historical actors could have imagined. Indeed even the labels of what constitutes ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ data differ between historians and other groups of social scientists. What the historian then faces is piecing together traces of the past much like an archaeologist might do when exploring new ruins. The main difference is that the business historian deals with written records while the archaeologist deals with physical remains, but in both cases often as much (or more) remains hidden as is brought to light in the process of discovery. This process, and the gaps in data continuity that it allows, appear to bother social scientists whose epistemological approach is steeped in the rationalist arguments of the physical sciences and applies only to the data they have actively sought to collect. That other elements can be discarded as irrelevant to the analysis likewise troubles historians for whom contingency and context are vitally important pieces of the story.

There are a number of significant factors here which the article discusses at some length, but what is striking about the discussion is that there is, perhaps ironically, seemingly little consideration for how these disciplines arose and evolved over time and whether these differences in development might be at the root of the issue. History as an activity reaches back to antiquity but the modern discipline of history received fresh articulation in the early nineteenth century. In contrast, the fields one might ascribe to the ‘social science’ area relevant to business and management (anthropology, communications, economics, geography, sociology, and psychology, for example) tend as a group to be newer and as part of their growth had to justify space in the academic environment for themselves. The process of doing so led these fields to ally themselves with the methods and approaches of the physical sciences to gain scientific credibility in a way that the traditional subject of history never did. The discipline of history, and by extension business and management history, is now playing a catch-up game to find ways to articulate and justify its value as a discipline in the face of criticism from practitioners in other fields. Perchard et. al. try to move this process forward by explaining to historians how their work could or should be explained differently (not necessarily done differently) to assist non-historians in assessing and appreciating its value. Here they remind us of the work of Andrews and Burke (2007) whose ‘five Cs’ (change over time, causality, context, complexity, and contingency) provide a useful guide to help non-specialists appreciate the aspects that historians are likely to fix upon as explanatory variables. The authors also point to the work of Jones and Khanna (2006) and Maclean, Harvey, and Clegg (2016) as helpful in making historical work relevant to mainstream business and management studies.

The article is a valuable contribution to the on-going effort to bring management and business historians closer to those studying and theorizing about management and business activity. Its relevance touches on a number of critical issues both in the academic field of study and related to the career development of those engaged in this kind of research.

References

Andrews, Thomas and Burke, Flannery (2007), “What Does it Mean to Think Historically?”, Perspectives in History, available at: https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/january-2007/what-does-it-mean-to-think-historically

Duara, Prasenjit (1998), “Why is History Anti-theoretical?”, Modern China, 24(2): 106.

Jones, Geoffrey and Khanna, Tarun (2006), “Bringing History (Back) into International Business,” Journal of International Business Studies, 37(4): 453-68.

Maclean, Mairi, Harvey, Charles and Clegg, Stewart (2016), “Conceptualizing Historical Organization Studies,” Academy of Management Review, 41(4): 609-32.

Palm Oil, Rubber, and Colonialism

The Emergence of an Export Cluster: Traders and Palm Oil in Early Twentieth-century Southeast Asia

by Valeria Giacomin (Harvard-Newcomen Fellow in Business History during 2017/2018)

Abstract: Malaysia and Indonesia account for 90 percent of global exports of palm oil, forming one of the largest agricultural clusters in the world. This article uses archival sources to trace how this cluster emerged from the rubber business in the era of British and Dutch colonialism. Specifically, the rise of palm oil in this region was due to three interrelated factors: (1) the institutional environment of the existing rubber cluster; (2) an established community of foreign traders; and (3) a trading hub in Singapore that offered a multitude of advanced services. This analysis stresses the historical dimension of clusters, which has been neglected in the previous management and strategy works, by connecting cluster emergence to the business history of trading firms. The article also extends the current literature on cluster emergence by showing that the rise of this cluster occurred parallel, and intimately related, to the product specialization within international trading houses.

Freely available at Enterprise and Society, Volume 19, Issue 2, June 2018, pp. 272-308

Review by Helena Varkkey (University of Malaya)

In this article, Giacomin presents an archive-based historical analysis of how palm oil became one of the most important traded commodities from Southeast Asia to the world in the early- to mid-1900s. She uses the cluster (defined as a “geographically proximate group of interconnected companies and associated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and complementarities”) approach to explain how the organizational structure of the pre-existing rubber cluster in the Malay peninsula (at the time a British colony) and Sumatra (under the Dutch) formed the basis for an emerging palm oil cluster in the same geographical region.

The first part of her paper focuses on how the regional rubber cluster structure developed. While the literature commonly credits unique local factors in the development of such clusters, Giacomin instead looks at nonlocal factors: (1) mainland Chinese traders that controlled regional trading routes from major Southeast Asian ports and brought in low-skilled tappers and harvesters from surrounding territories, and (2) Western traders that brought in capital inputs (seeds, machinery and finance) and highly-skilled human resources (estate managers and engineers) from Europe and other parts of the Empire and established headquarters in major European trading ports, allowing them to access crucial market information on demand. Both of these foreign merchant communities congregated in the emerging trading hub of Singapore, strategically located in between British Malaya and Dutch Sumatra, and developed a mutual dependency: Chinese contacts were vital for Western traders wanting to run a business in the Eastern colonies, while the Chinese needed Western traders to scale up their region-based commercial activity to a global scope.

The second part of the article explains how palm oil became the “spin-off” crop of the rubber cluster in the region. During the natural rubber boom in the early 1900s, the Malaya-Sumatra rubber cluster became over-dependent on this export and thus over-specialised in terms of existing practises, agronomic knowledge (through R&D agencies like the Rubber Research Institute), and coordinating institutions (eg. the Rubber Growers’ Association). When the advent of synthetic rubber in the 1920s caused natural rubber prices to fall, companies desperately looked to diversify their production to recoup and replace their losses. However, this over-specialisation meant that they could consider only a limited range of crops similar to rubber for diversification. As it happened, the rubber estate structure could be conveniently repurposed for into oil palm estates. Furthermore, the oil palm flourished in a much narrower latitude span compared to rubber, giving confidence to companies that the demand for palm oil would be more sustained since supply would be more limited.
Giacomin concludes that even though the literature often regards over-specialisation as fatal, in the case of the Southeast Asian rubber cluster, this serendipitously led to the emergence of one of the most enduring regional clusters serving the global economy. Today, Indonesia and Malaysia account for over 90% of global palm oil exports.

While the significance of the rubber sector in paving the way for palm oil in Malaysia and Indonesia is well known, this paper remains an important and significant addition to the current literature, not only on general business management and strategy, but also more specifically in terms of (1) palm oil expansion and development and (2) agricultural systems (estate vs. smallholdings).

Firstly, the specific role of nonlocal (especially Chinese) entrepreneurs in connecting the production areas in this region to the consumption areas in the West was previously not well understood. In the context of the “global north” and “global south”, palm oil can be considered a uniquely “southern” vegetable oil. Compared to other oils like sunflower, rapeseed, and soya bean, the production, major business players, beneficiaries and direct impacts of palm oil is situated more comparatively in the global south. Giacomin alludes to this in reference to the narrow latitude where oil palm can be grown. This northern/southern framing has coloured much of the recent debates and controversies over palm oil today. This paper’s analysis on the historical role of Chinese merchants is especially useful in further informing the idea of palm oil as a “southern” oil, while at the same time, the equally important role of the Western merchants that Giacomin highlights may be useful in moderating certain northern arguments in this ongoing debate.

Secondly, the historical nature of Giacomin’s analysis of this sector is especially timely in the current period where other regions, like West Africa and Latin America, are looking to increase their global trading share of palm oil. Giacomin mentions that even though the oil palm originated from and was first produced commercially in West Africa during colonial times, Western African territories were unable to effectively penetrate global markets because they did not display the same institutional cohesion across neighbouring territories, something that Southeast Asia managed to do through the pre-existing rubber cluster. This “cluster” model may thus provide an exemplar to be used by emerging palm oil production regions and companies as an effective way to possibly break the current oligopoly (Indonesian and Malaysian firms) which is the palm oil industry. Especially for West Africa, which is considered the current “greenfield” area for palm oil outside Southeast Asia, current strategies can be developed to avoid past mistakes.

Finally, Giacomin’s analysis of early smallholders is useful to inform current discussions on the ideal agricultural systems for oil palm. Her paper argues that in the mid-20th century, the fact that the palm oil was an estate crop (involving high costs and favouring large-scale production) provided a solution to the problem previously faced by rubber companies that were facing competition from and losing market share to rubber smallholdings. While this might have been the case historically, oil palm today has been successfully adapted to the smallholder model in both Indonesia and Malaysia, with a significant share of both countries’ production (about 40% each) coming from either organised or independent smallholders. Giacomin’s analysis stops at the early decolonialisation period, before the newly independent nations began to formulate oil palm smallholder schemes as a strategic tool for rural development and poverty eradication for both countries. Her analysis however can serve as a useful starting point in the ongoing debates on if and how both the estate and smallholder systems can co-exist efficiently and in harmony.

Overall, this paper is a valuable piece of business history that helps to further shed light on a controversial agro-economic sector often shrouded in secrecy. The fact that palm oil continues to be a hot topic worldwide today underlines the relevance and importance of such forays into history to inform the present.

From VoxEU – Wellbeing inequality in retrospect

A must read – Leandro Prados de la Escosura (databases and open access book on inequality)

The Long Run

Rising trends in GDP per capita are often interpreted as reflecting rising levels of general wellbeing. But GDP per capita is at best a crude proxy for wellbeing, neglecting important qualitative dimensions. 36 more words

via Wellbeing inequality in retrospect — VoxEU.org: Recent Articles

To elaborate further on the topic, Prof. Leandro de la Escosura has made available several databases on inequality, accessible here, as well as a book on long-term Spanish economic growth, available as open source here

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Evaluating the Distinctive Economic Impact of Historical Female Migration in the United States

A Woman’s Touch? Female Migration and Economic Development in the United States

By Viola von Berlepsch (London School of Economics), Andrés Rodríguez-Pose (London School of Economics) and Neil Lee (London School of Economics),

Abstract: Does the economic effect of immigrant women differ from that of immigrants in general? This paper examines if gender has influenced the short- and long-term economic impact of mass migration to the US, using Census microdata from 1880 and 1910. By means of ordinary least squares and instrumental variable estimations, the analysis shows that a greater concentration of immigrant women is significantly associated with lower levels of economic development in US counties. However, immigrant women also shaped economic development positively, albeit indirectly via their children. Communities with more children born to foreign mothers and that successfully managed to integrate female immigrants experienced greater economic growth than those dominated by children of foreign-born fathers or American-born parents.

URL: https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/cprceprdp/12878.htm

Circulated by NEP-HIS on 2018-05-08

Review by Fernando Arteaga (George Mason University)

Summary

What is the economic impact of female migration? The authors seek to answer the inquiry by using the United States in the late 19th and early 20th century as their study case. The goal of the paper is to highlight the distinctiveness of women immigration (compared to that of men), both in the processes that led women to migrate, the characteristics they had, and the places where they finally settled. The main thesis of paper stresses the long-lasting effect women have had; through their family role, as mothers, they facilitated the formation and transmission of social capital, which had a pervasive positive effect on income.

Female migrants in early America tended to settle mainly on urbanized areas in the Northeastern coast – compared to that of male immigrants (who settled mainly in the South and West). The migration levels of women, in absolute terms, were lower, and their marriage rates higher. More importantly, their labor participation rates were low: women tended to stay and work in domestic chores rather than find occupations in the market. These characteristics make female migration distinct to that of men, and motivate the goal of the paper in trying to assess their particular relevance.

 

 

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Figure 1: Immigrant Women in the United States, 1880. By the nature of the variable, counties with a larger share of immigrant women imply a lower share of immigrant men.

 

The text relies on standard econometric analyses, based on intuition and on the literature of migration and culture transmission. The main data sources are the historical censuses of 1880 and 1910, which capture the amount of, male and female foreign-born population residents in each US county (among other data).  The paper presents two base regressions that aim to assess the direct and indirect economic impact of female migration, both in the short and the long term. The first model regresses economic income (GDP per capita by county) on female migration (foreign-born women as a share of the total population in the county). They find that the variables are negatively correlated: lack of labor market participation hindered the female contribution to income. The authors also found that this has had a long term negative effect (income today is also negatively correlated with female migration in late 19th and early 20th century) [1]. To correct for potential biases and to establish a causality linkage that goes strictly from migration to income, and not the other way around, the authors use three different instruments: a) the percentage of married persons; b) the number of persons living in a household; c) the urbanization rate of the county being examined. The first instrument accounts for the fact that female migrants tended to be married in larger shares than the rest of the population. The second accounts for the idea that migrants, especially women, tended to stay with members of their families through their lifetime. The last one maintains that female migrants favored settlement in urbanized zones. The validity of an instrument (marriage percentage, household size and urbanization) hinges upon it being correlated with the dependent variable (income) only by it causing the highlighted mechanism (female migration). The authors do several post-hoc statistical tests to evaluate the instrument’s validity and conclude that it is indeed a valid and strong one. In any case, the instrument variable outcomes do not change the results of the baseline ordinary least squares scenario, they just allow a more robust interpretation of them: it can be said that female migration did have a negative impact on income.

The second model emphasizes the indirect impact of migrant women. Maybe women themselves did not positively contribute to the economic wellbeing of their communities, but they could have done so through other means. The authors refer to the literature that stresses how mothers influence their children behavior and thus have an important role as social capital transmitters (which could positively affect economic wellbeing).  They regress economic income today on the share of children (in 1880 and 1910) born from: 1) a migrant mother and an American-born father; 2) a migrant father and an American mother; 3) both American parents. The standard base of comparison is the share of children that had both parents as immigrants [2].  By definition, the model can only capture the long-term effect of female migrants. The authors find that US counties with an historical larger share of children with migrant mothers are correlated with larger incomes today – in comparison to the other explanatory variables; having American parents is negatively correlated with income today; having a migrant father, and American mother, has a non-significant and null effect on economic outcomes today. The argument, again, rests on the case of social capital transmission: women, as mothers, matter very much.  To corroborate their OLS results they also use an instrumental variable. The authors assume that American-born women that had migrant mothers followed the cultural transmission pattern established by their forebears. They call this the “supply-push” component, which they estimate and use as their instrument. Just as the first model, the instrumental variable inclusion does not modify the basic results, it only permits to talk about causality from migrants in the past to better economic outcomes today.

In conclusion, the paper finds that female immigration, while having a negative direct short-term impact on economic income, has a long-lasting positive effect through the “cultural carrier” channel.

Comment

The paper is a very interesting one, being one of the few studies that aims to disentangle the impact of women as migrants compared to that of men. The results the authors present make intuitive sense. I would like to make just small technical comments based on the variables they use and how they use them.

First, related to the semantics of the concept of “migration.” Migration is normally thought as a flow variable, but here it is used as a stock variable. Given the data they use (measuring migrants as people classified as foreign born in two censuses) the authors cannot measure the impact of migration as a flow, only the impact of it in broad terms. This is not a problem. I just would have liked to see a minor explanation on the paper that clarified the interpretations that we could get out of this. In fact, I think it could explain why they find a negative impact of migrant women in income (if the variables were flows, through migration rates and economic growth, the results may be different).

Second, on a more technical note, I’m skeptic of the instruments being used. Even though the authors argue that they are valid and strong, I remain unconvinced. The authors show that all four of them are correlated with the dependent variable and uncorrelated with the error terms, yet there is almost no explanation, backed up by a narrative, of how exactly these instruments impact on income only through female migration. For each one of the instruments used I could think of other alternate channels by which they could impact income. For example, the use of percentage of marriage by county could indeed be correlated with female migration, but is that the only potential channel? Could it not be that maybe poverty or religion could be impacting income as well?

Lastly, I wish the narrative part could be explained in larger detail. For example, how exactly female migrants in 1880 have a direct impact on income in 2010. Or how exactly children of foreign mothers in 1880 and 1910 could affect income today. It is one thing to say that culture matters, it is another different thing to point how exactly it does. In fact, even though they do mention the pervasiveness of cultural traits through time, they fail to mention that this pervasiveness does not imply ipso facto a good outcome is assured. Sometimes, social capital is also correlated with bad outcomes.

[1] The authors do not provide a concise explanation of why this could be happening: how could a century year old female migration pattern directly impact economic wellbeing today?

[2] All the interpretations of results are in comparison to that baseline.

The Economic Consequences of the Napoleonic Wars

The Napoleonic Wars: A Watershed in Spanish History?

By Leandro Prados de la Escosura (Carlos III University de Madrid) and Carlos Santiago-Caballero (Carlos III University de Madrid).

Abstract: The Napoleonic Wars had dramatic consequences for Spain’s economy. The Peninsular War had higher demographic impact than any other military conflict, including civil wars, in the modern era. Farmers suffered confiscation of their crops and destruction of their main capital asset, livestock. The shrinking demand, the disruption of international and domestic trade, and the shortage of inputs hampered industry and services. The loss of the American colonies, a by-product of the French invasion, seriously harmed absolutism. In the long run, however, the Napoleonic Wars triggered the dismantling of Ancien Régime institutions and interest groups. Freed from their constraints, the country started a long and painful transition towards the liberal society. The Napoleonic Wars may be deemed, then, a watershed in Spanish history.

URL: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hes:wpaper:0130

Distributed by NEP-HIS on: 2018-04-30

Review by: Guido Alfani (Bocconi University)

goya-muertadehambre

Figure 1: Francisco de Goya, Muerta de hambre, c. 1812-1820. Drawing. Source: see entry in Goya en El Prado.

Summary

Large-scale war, as well as other major shocks that punctuate human history – plagues and famines for example – have been the object of much recent research in economic history, especially regarding their long-term consequences. Leandro Prados de la Escosura and Carlos Santiago-Caballero focus on the so-called “Peninsular War” which followed Napoleon’s invasion of Spain in 1808. They set out to provide an in-depth analysis of the short-term effects of this devastating war, then focusing on their long-term consequences. They argue that although the immediate consequences of war were considerably damaging to the Spanish economy, in the long run they were probably positive as the Peninsular War triggered the transition from an absolutist empire to a modern nation. They support their argument by means of counterfactual analysis.

This paper presents an overview of recent research on different dimensions of the Spanish economy during the eighteenth and nineteenth century, re-organized around how the Peninsular War raging from 1808 to 1814 affected the trends. Much of this research has been published in Spanish, often in publications difficult to find outside of Spain, and consequently this paper is precious for international scholars as a kind of guide to recent achievements in Spanish economic history.

Overall, the Peninsular War, which was triggered by the invasion of Spain by Napoleonic armies – first a peaceful process, agreed upon with the Spanish authorities in order to force Portugal to enforce the “continental block” trade policies against Britain and leading to the Franco-Spanish invasion of Portugal in 1807 – had negative economic consequences in the short run. This is clear looking at the industrial sector, which suffered because of a sharp reduction in internal and international demand as well, the unrestricted influx of French and British goods, a shortage of inputs and high war taxation. Certain sectors – like the luxury productions organized around the Reales Fábricas or “Royal Factories” – never recovered. War also badly affected trade, which was disrupted both at the national and international scale, suffered because of increasing transportation costs and was badly hindered by interruption of contacts with the colonies.

The immediate impact of war is less clear on agriculture, given that on the one hand war led to plundering and confiscation by the armies, while on the other hand it brought to an end Old Regime institutions that vexed the countryside, like the tithe paid to religious institutions. In addition, a large-scale process of confiscation and sale of lands and real estate owned by the Church (the desamortización) took place, leading to a spread of private (lay) property and altering the distribution of wealth across the country. The impact of war on agriculture, however, has to be understood also in the light of the widespread famines affecting Spain during the war period.

More generally, from the demographic point of view the Peninsular War was clearly catastrophic, leading to “population falling one million short of its potential and its direct effect representing half a million casualties, around 5 per cent of the population” (p. 18). To place these figures in the right perspective, the authors note that this is more than double the population loss during the 1936-39 Civil War.

Beyond the desamortización, war also had other important political and institutional consequences. First of all, it started the process ultimately leading to the independence of Spanish America, as also argued by Grafe and Irigoin (2012). This has crucial importance to the way in which the authors frame their discussion of the long-term consequences of the Peninsular War, as specialists in the history of fiscal systems have clarified how colonial revenues to the Crown were instrumental in enforcing state centralization in the mainland (Yun Casalilla 1998). In other words, “empire strengthened absolutist monarchy” (p. 19).

Taken together, the liberalization of the land market – through the desamortización and the end of impartible inheritance systems like the mayorazgo – and the weakening of the absolutist power of the crown would have favored the “Liberal Revolution” sweeping through Spain during the immediate post-war decades.

In the authors’ view, this causal connection between the Peninsular War and the Liberal Revolution explains why although the short-term consequences of war were negative, the long-term ones were probably positive. They support this argument by a simple counterfactual analysis (which is openly presented by the authors as just the first step in a more encompassing research program). The analysis provides some statistical support to the idea that the Peninsular War marked a structural break in the long-term economic development of Spain. In particular, by the mid-nineteenth century per-capita GDP might have been 12% higher, real wages 139% higher, and land rents 30% lower than they would have been if the Peninsular War had not taken place.

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Figure 2The Battle of Vittoria, June 21st 1813. Print. Source: See entry in The British Museum Collection Online.

Comment
This paper is an interesting contribution to the study of the economic impact of major shocks. In earlier research, one of the authors has contributed to clarify that the most iconic “bad in the short-run, positive in the long-run” shock, the fourteenth-century Black Death, had in fact long-term negative consequences in Spain due to the low population density of this European area in the Middle Ages (Álvarez Nogal and Prados de la Escosura 2013). Consequently, there is no reason to believe that the authors have any kind of a-priori in favor of positive long-term consequences of mortality shocks, which unfortunately seems to be a fairly common sin in much contemporary economic history (see further discussion, for the case of plague, in Alfani and Murphy 2017).

Additionally, the paper is built around a detailed and sector-by-sector analysis of how the Peninsular War affected directly the Spanish economy, which is a nice change from the wave of econometric articles in which the actual mechanisms through which crises might have affected the real economy are often just hinted at. For the same reason, this paper offers interesting elements for a comparison with recent research on the economic consequences of wars and other major shocks, research which has focused mostly on the medieval and early modern period (for example, Alfani 2013; Curtis 2014). Given the focus of the paper, the points made about the direct, short-term impact of war are somewhat stronger than the argument about a positive impact in the long run, which might still be the result of other causal factors. However, in this regard the paper is quite openly presented as just a first step, and a very necessary one, given the crucial importance of exploring and clarifying the historical mechanisms through which shocks might affect an economy before proceeding to complex statistical analyses of the data.

Looked at from this perspective, the paper presents only minor issues. A more detailed historical narrative of the Peninsular War would indeed be useful to the international reader. More importantly, no reference whatsoever is done to the fact that the French invasion triggered a phase of institutional and political change across much of continental Europe. The sale of Church property for example, as well as the end of fideicommissa and mayorascos, occurred throughout Catholic Europe. So there is reason to wonder why the Peninsular War would have had different consequences from the (forceful) spread of French innovating ideas and institutions that occurred in other parts of Europe. An obvious difference is, of course, the large-scale demographic impact of war itself – but in the current version of the paper, it is not clear whether the authors are considering the possibility of “Malthusian” dynamics interacting with political and institutional change. For example, to what degree the reported increase in per-capita GDP is the consequence of improvements in the institutional framework, and to what degree it is instead the result of a mass mortality-induced rebalancing of the resources/population ratio? This is a particularly important question, given that much of the war-related mortality was due to widespread famine, possibly to an even larger scale than the authors imply, as suggested by the most recent systematic analysis of famine in Spain (Pérez Moreda 2017).

Selected bibliography

  • Alfani, Guido (2013), Calamities and the Economy in Renaissance Italy. The Grand Tour of the Horsemen of the Apocalypse. Basingstoke: Palgrave
  • Alfani, Guido and Murphy, T. (2017), “Plague and Lethal Epidemics in the Pre-Industrial World”, Journal of Economic History 77(1), 314-343.
  • Álvarez Nogal, Carlos, and Leandro Prados de la Escosura (2013), “The Rise and Fall of Spain (1270–1850)”, Economic History Review, 66 (1), 1–37.
  • Curtis, Daniel R. (2014), Coping with Crisis. The Resilience and Vulnerability of Pre-Industrial Settlements. Farnham: Ashgate.
  • Grafe, Regina, and Alejandra Irigoin. (2012), “A Stakeholder Empire: the Political Economy of Spanish Imperial Rule in America”, Economic History Review 65 (2), 609–651.
  • Yun Casalilla, Bartolomé. (1998), “The American Empire and The Spanish Economy: An Institutional Perspective”, Revista de Historia Económica 16 (1), 123-156.
  • Pérez Moreda, Vicente (2017), “Spain”, in Guido Alfani and Cormac Ó Gráda (eds.), Famine in European History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 48-72.

Are Macroprudential Tools as Caring and Forethinking as They Claim to Be? Financial Stability and Monetary Policy in the Long Run

An Historical Perspective on the Quest for Financial Stability and the Monetary Policy Regime

By Michael D. Bordo (Rutgers University)

Abstract: This paper surveys the co-evolution of monetary policy and financial stability for a number of countries across four exchange rate regimes from 1880 to the present. I present historical evidence on the incidence, costs and determinants of financial crises, combined with narratives on some famous financial crises. I then focus on some empirical historical evidence on the relationship between credit booms, asset price booms and serious financial crises. My exploration suggests that financial crises have many causes, including credit driven asset price booms, which have become more prevalent in recent decades, but that in general financial crises are very heterogeneous and hard to categorize. Two key historical examples stand out in the record of serious financial crises which were linked to credit driven asset price booms and busts: the 1920s and 30s and the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. The question that arises is whether these two ‘perfect storms’ should be grounds for permanent changes in the monetary and financial environment.

URL: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24154

Distributed by NEP-HIS on: 2018-01-15

Review by: Sergio Castellanos-Gamboa (Bangor University)

Summary 

In this paper Michael Bordo presents empirical historical evidence to analyze the incidence of credit-driven asset price booms and the extent to which they cause deep financial crises. The main argument of the paper is that we have to consider very carefully whether monetary policy should suffer a structural transformation whenever a rare “perfect storm” event occurs. Bordo supports this argument by looking at the correlation between and possible causality from credit-driven asset price booms to financial crises. The relation, he argues, is rather weak. Nonetheless, the consequences of implementing restrictive monetary policies when these events happen can be significantly bad in the long run.

The paper begins by reviewing the historical evolution of monetary and financial stability policy. In section 2 the author summarizes the appearance of central banks and the evolution of their functions and responsibilities, mainly as lender of last resort (LLR), across five diBordosq.jpgfferent periods: the “Classical Gold Standard”, the “Interwar and World War II”, the “Bretton Woods” period between 1944-1973, the “Managed Float Regime” between 1973-2006, and the “Global Financial Crisis”.

The next section of the paper deals with the measurement of financial crises in historical perspective. It starts by clarifying the definition of financial crises and looking at how this definition has changed from describing a banking panic to include “too important to fail” institutions, currency crises, sovereign debt crises, credit-driven asset price booms, sudden stops, and contagions. Of these crises, Bordo identifies five of them as global: 1890-1891, 1907-1908, 1913-1914, 1931-1932, and 2007-2008. He then turns to report the output losses of those global financial crises, using the cumulative percentage deviation of GDP per capita from the pre-crisis trend level of per capita GDP. He finds that in “the pre-1914 era the losses ranged from 3% to 6% of GDP. For the interwar period, driven by the Great Depression they are much larger – 40%. In the post Bretton Woods period losses are smaller than the interwar but larger than under the gold standard”. Finally, he finds that output losses in the period after 1997 are larger than in the pre-1914 period. The author ends this section by analysing the determinants of financial crises. Using a meta-study he concludes that financial crises are quite heterogeneous, and no particular factor stands out as a main determinant for their occurrence.

Section 4 of the paper reviews the historical narrative of a subset of 12 cases to evaluate the extent to which credit-driven asset price booms have been an important cause of financial crises. Bordo argues that although after the 2007-2008 crisis this factor has become more relevant, this was not the case before the collapse of Bretton Woods, with a few exceptions before World War II. Section 5 looks deeper into the relationship among credit booms, asset price booms, and financial crises using a business cycle methodology with a sample of 15 advanced countries from 1880 onwards. Once again, there is evidence that “suggests that the coincidence between credit boom peaks and serious financial crises is quite rare”. Moreover, credit booms do not seem to be highly correlated with asset price booms (except for the Great Depression and the Global Financial Crisis).

 The paper concludes by stating that there are four key principles to be followed to have a stable monetary policy regime that can be compatible with financial stability. These are: price stability, real macro stability, a credible rules-based LLR, and sound financial supervision and regulation and banking structure. These principles do not suggest that financial stability has to be elevated to the same level of importance as price stability or macroeconomic stability, and that implementing macroprudential tools to restrict monetary policy after a “perfect storm” can be more dangerous than beneficial in the long run.

Comments 

This paper brings important elements to the debate of whether implementing macroprudential tools is the right path to achieve financial stability. Moreover, Bordo raises a critical question that has not been properly addressed in the literature. To what extent can macroprudential tools be harmful for long-run economic growth? Additionally, the author invites us to question whether central banks should undertake activities that go beyond monetary policy (as bailing out failing institutions) to the point of putting at risk their credibility and even their independence, as it has already happened in the past.

Once again economic history becomes relevant to understand and shed a new light to contemporary debates. In particular, this paper implements a transparent and simple methodology to analyze whether credit-driven asset price booms can cause financial crises and if monetary policy should be fundamentally transformed when financial markets are hit by a “perfect storm”. The author is quite skeptical of the implementation of restrictive monetary policies to deal with serious financial crises, although there is still considerable room for more research to clarify this debate. Even though Bordo avoids using econometrics to assess this issue, the methodology proposed in this paper can still be subject to the Lucas critique (Lucas 1976). Therefore, there is still the need for a robust methodology that can provide evidence to produce a sound and testable economic theory to thoroughly study and understand this phenomenon.

More important, we still have to ask whether we can differentiate real productivity booms from bubbles. If there is still a lack of knowledge in this area we will not be able to know if we have the appropriate tools to diagnose a bubble and defuse an asset price boom before it bursts. Therefore, we cannot state for sure whether central banks should follow the Greenspan doctrine (Bernanke and Getler 2001), or if they should be more proactive in the procurement of financial stability. Even more and following the main argument of the paper, it is very important to ask and understand if financial stability should be granted the same importance as price stability or the stability of the real macroeconomy. For now, the answer seems to be no, but there also seems to be sufficient evidence to argue that banking should be made boring again (Krugman 2009).

References

Bernanke, Ben and Mark Gertler (2001). “Should Central Banks Respond to Movements in Asset Prices?” American Economic Review91(2), 253-257.

Krugman, Paul (2009). “Making banking boring.” New York Times, April 10.

Lucas, Robert (1976). “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique.” In Allan H. Meltzer and Karl Brunner. The Phillips Curve and Labor Markets. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy. 1. New York: American Elsevier, 19–46.