Category Archives: Europe

Ancient Infrastructure and Economic Activity

 

Roman Roads to Prosperity: Persistence and Non-Persistence of Public Goods Provision

Carl-Johan Dalgaard (University of Copenhagen and CEPR), Nicolai Kaarsen (Danish Economic Council), Ola Olsson (University of Gothenburg) and Pablo Selaya (University of Copenhagen)

Abstract: How persistent is public goods provision in a comparative perspective? We explore the link between infrastructure investments made during antiquity and the presence of infrastructure today, as well as the link between early infrastructure and economic activity both in the past and in the present, across the entire area under dominion of the Roman Empire at the zenith of its geographical extension. We find a remarkable pattern of persistence showing that greater Roman road density goes along with (a) greater modern road density, (b) greater settlement formation in 500 CE, and (c) greater economic activity in 2010. Interestingly, however, the degree of persistence in road density and the link between early road density and contemporary economic development is weakened to the point of insignificance in areas where the use of wheeled vehicles was abandoned from the first millennium CE until the late modern period. Taken at face value, our results suggest that infrastructure may be one important channel through which persistence in comparative development comes about.

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12745&r=his

Distributed by NEP-HIS on: 2018-03-26

Revised by: Martin Söderhäll (Uppsala University)

Summary

In the paper Roman Roads to Prosperity: Persistence and Non-Persistence of Public Goods Provision the question “How persistent is public goods provision in a comparative perspective?” is examined by estimating the impact of Roman road-density on various proxies for economic activity today (modern roads, night-lights and population density) and in 500 CE (roman settlements). This is done for areas of Europe, the Middle East and Northern Africa covered by Roman roads in 117 CE. The authors argue that the Roman roads “almost presents itself as a natural experiment” since the main purpose of the roads was to simplify military logistics during Roman times. This led to a road network with roads constructed as straight as possible between nodes, especially in newly conquered and undeveloped areas of the Roman Empire.

roman roads_paris

Figure 1: Roman Roads and Night Lights around Paris

The main findings in the paper are that Roman road density in 117 CE has a statistically significant positive effect on all of the above-mentioned dependent variables, suggesting that the spatial distribution of ancient infrastructure still affects the location of economic activity almost 2000 years later. However, the historical density of ancient infrastructure is not enough to explain the density of modern infrastructure as well as economic activity. The authors hypothesize that persistent use and maintenance of said infrastructure is a necessary condition for the link. To examine the hypotheses the authors’ exploit regional variation in the use of wheeled transport during the first millennia CE. This historical natural experiment is made possible since the Middle East and North Africa abandoned wheeled transport during this period, most probably due to the use of camels, which became a more efficient means of transportation in the region some time during the first millennia (Bulliet 1990).

roman_roads_night

Figure 2: Roman Roads Network in 117 CE

The developments in the Middle East and North Africa during the first millennia CE led to ancient Roman roads being used to much lesser extent than in Europe were wheeled vehicles (drawn by horses or oxen) continued to dominate among land-based means of transportation up until the nineteenth century. Thus, the authors’ claim, “one should expect influence of Roman roads today only where persistence in infrastructure is found.” In other words, the effect of Roman roads on economic activity today should be insignificant within the Middle East and in North Africa while it should have a positive effect within Europe. However, one should also expect that the density of Roman roads had a positive effect on economic activity in all studied regions before the abandonment of the wheel and the subsequent loss of interest in the use and maintenance of Roman roads in the Middle East and in North Africa.

roman_roads_modern

Figure 3: Relationship between Roman Road Density in 177 CE and Modern Road Density

Econometrically, the hypotheses set by the authors are examined by a cross-sectional specification where the parameter of interest is the influence of Roman road density on various measures of economic activity today and in 500 CE, controlling for (primarily) geographic traits of the grid cells where road density are measured as well as country and language fixed-effects. The empirical results are in line with those hypothesized by the authors. The density of Roman roads had a statistically significant positive effect on economic activity in all specifications except the ones where the modern day variables capturing the degree of economic activity “today” is regressed on Roman road density in the Middle East and North Africa, further strengthening the argument that persistence in infrastructure can explain comparative development over a period of 2000 years.

Comments

The interpretation and implication of the empirical result is quite straightforward. It is clearly a good idea to keep investing in infrastructure as long as the infrastructure has an economic value, something the authors show was the case in Europe but less so in the Middle East and North Africa where the value of Roman infrastructure dropped. At first sight, one potential remark is the large time gap between the cross sections. How would the interpretation of the results look like if the link between Roman roads and economic activity disappeared in large parts of Europe some time during the period 500-2010 CE? Results from previous research (Bosker et. al. 2013; Bosker & Buringj 2017) ease the worry of this question slightly, since they have shown a relationship between Roman road-hubs and city sizes during the period 800-1800. However, it would have been nice to see some specifications for the years between 500 CE and 2010 CE in this paper as well, possibly using city sizes from DeVries (2013) or Bairoch (1991) as a proxy for economic activity. Especially since the scope differs a bit from that in Bosker et. al. (2013) where the estimation (to my knowledge) is done in a panel setting and in Bosker & Buringj (2017) where only Europe is studied.

Aside from that, I have very little to remark on; I find the argumentation against potential threats to internal validity convincing, and find arguments against external validity quite irrelevant due to the exploratory nature of the paper. In a way, the paper can be summarized as both fun and fascinating.

References

Bairoch, P. (1991). Cities and Economic Development: From the Dawn of History to the Present. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Bosker, M., Buringh, E., & van Zanden, J. L. (2013). “From Baghdad to London: Unraveling Urban Development in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, 800–1800.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 95 (4), 1418-1437.

Bosker, M., & Buringh, E. (2017). “City Seeds: Geography and the Origins of the European City System.” Journal of Urban Economics 98, 139-157.

Bulliet, R. W. (1990). The Camel and the Wheel.  New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

De Vries, J. (2013). European Urbanization, 1500-1800. London: Routledge.

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from VOX – The return of regional inequality: Europe from 1900 to today

by Joan Rosés (LES) and Nikolaus Wolf (Humboldt University)

 

 

via EHS The Long Run

Original post Here

Under Siege and Under Fire: German Angst, the Second World War and the Long-Term Psychological Impact

Did Strategic Bombing in the Second World War lead to ‘German Angst’? A Large-Scale Empirical Test across 89 German Cities.

Martin Obschonka (Queensland University of Technology, Australia), Michael Stützer (Baden Wuerttemberg Cooperative State University and Ilmenau University of Technology, Germany) , P. Jason Rentfrow (University of Cambridge, UK), Jeff Potter (Atof Inc., USA), Samuel D. Gosling (University of Texas at Austin, USA, and School of Psychological Sciences, University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia)

Abstract: A widespread stereotype holds that the Germans are notorious worriers, an idea captured by the term, German Angst. An analysis of country-level neurotic personality traits (Trait Anxiety, Trait Depression, and Trait Neuroticism; N = 7,210,276) across 109 countries provided mixed support for this idea; Germany ranked 20th, 31st, and 53rd for Depression, Anxiety, and Neuroticism respectively suggesting, at best, the national stereotype is only partly valid. Theories put forward to explain the stereotypical characterization of Germany focus on the collective traumatic events experienced by Germany during WWII, such as the massive strategic bombing of German cities. We thus examined the link between strategic bombing of 89 German cities and today’s regional levels in neurotic traits (N = 33,534) and related mental health problems. Contrary to the WWII-bombing hypothesis, we found negative effects of strategic bombing on regional Trait Depression and mental health problems. This finding was robust when controlling for a host of economic factors and social structure. We also found Resilience X Stressor interactions: Cities with more severe bombings show more resilience today: lower levels of neurotic traits and mental health problems in the face of a current major stressor – economic hardship.

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:83680&r=his

Distributed by NEP-HIS on: 2018-02-06

Review by: Mark J. Crowley (Wuhan University)

This paper is an interesting addition to the literature on the Second World War, and contributes to many areas concerning the impact of the war on civilian population. It builds on much of the British literature that has now served to coin the phrases “the people’s war” and the “stiff upper lip” to describe the way in which the British responded to the hardships caused by rationing and enemy bombings, and focuses on the nation that was seen as the aggressor in the conflict – Germany. While many studies have focused on the resistance of civilians against bombings and invasion, fewer have focused on the mental impact of such events on its citizens and future generations, least of all on the nation that was judged to be the loser in the conflict. The authors deftly trace how the impact of bombing could be traced to what is now commonly referred to as “German angst”– a phenomenon that is believed to have been created by the Second World War, but one that still endures today.

 

dresden

The bombing of Dresden was seen as a pivotal turning point in bringing a conclusion to the Second World War.

 

The authors clearly outline how the different strategies adopted by the varying militaries in the war led to different results. Their claim that the Americans used strategic bombing while the British indiscriminately targeted civilian areas is one that has received less attention in the historiography, especially among British military historians, but is one worth exploring further. While the bombing of Dresden is often seen as one of the last major raids of the Second World War, inflicting massive civilian casualties and effectively breaking the German resistance, the psychological impact on German citizens has received little attention. Moreover, the ensuing debates about national identity and nationhood that dominated German history in the post-1945 era have focused more on ideological and political factors rather than the perception of individuals and “the self” about their position in the nation, or indeed the position of their nation in the world.

dresden 2

Dresden in 2002 – some parts of the city were not reconstructed to serve as a reminder of the horrors of war

 

One very illuminating aspect of this article is how the authors trace that German angst can be correlated to regional and economic factors. Certain areas of Germany suffered disproportionately from the effects of bombing, and it is this, together with the impact of collective memory and the notion of national mourning that has affected the way in which angst is transmitted, perceived and perpetuated among communities. The decision for certain areas to preserve buildings in their damaged state from the war serves as a reminder of the horrors of war, while also serving to perpetuate the collective sense of angst and grief caused by the conflict. Furthermore, the correlation between economic hardship and sense is, according to the authors, influenced by region. It is clear that this argument has traction, and this can be correlated to other events, excluding war, where this phenomenon is clear. One need not look further than the impact of the mass closure of industries in Britain in the 1980s to witness the disparities among British regions caused by the anomie generated by the economic distress ensuing from the realignment of the economy to show how negative economic experiences can have a powerful impact on the human psyche.

Critique
This article is deeply researched, and seeks to make many connections across a range of different possibilities for the rise and incidence of depression, together with its consequent impact on the supposed notion of German angst. However, the authors concede that while it is possible to surmise that a connection exists, the lack of data suggests that it is not possible to prove definitively. In this respect, this article will hopefully provide fertile ground for further research and debate. The references to other countries that experienced bombings in wartime are apposite, and could be explored further in additional research. Moreover, the correlation between the end result of war and the long-term psychological effect could be the subject of further analysis. For example, propaganda both during and after the Second World War enforced the belief, in Britain at least, that the armed forces were fighting for freedom and were on the “right side” of the conflict. However, the post-war situation enforced the belief among the international community that the Germans were the aggressors and the guilty party. The annexation of the country at the end of the war was symptomatic of the international community’s response, and how, to a great extent, their punishment and future destiny was in the hands of other international actors. Thus, while the British could couch their feelings of anxiety within the larger national narrative that they had undergone their struggles to secure national freedom, and were operating within a framework of righteousness, the Germans, adjudged as the evil party at the end of the war had to deal with two difficult realities. The first being that they had lost the war, and the second that suggested the German “Sonderweg” and “Weltanschauung” was one that led it on a path to its own destruction, and one that would leave the rest of the international community seeing Germany as a negative force for some time.

References

  • Brakman, Steven, Harry Garretsen, and Marc Schramm. “The Strategic Bombing of German Cities during World War II and its Impact on City Growth.” Journal of Economic Geography 4.2 (2004): 201-218.
  • Tiratsoo, Nick. Reconstruction, Affluence, and Labour Politics: Coventry, 1945-1960. Routledge, 1990.
  • Schaffer, Ronald. “American Military Ethics in World War II: The Bombing of German Civilians.” Journal of American History (1980): 318-334

Note of the Deputy Editor: This post was originally called “The Spitfires are Coming! German Angst, the Second World War and the Long-Term Psychological Impact.” Alain Guery (EHESS) and Avner Offer (Oxford) kindly told us the Supermarine Spitfire was a plane that could escort bombers, but did not have the range to get to Germany. Accordingly, Mark Crowley changed the title of the post.

Spatially-Embedded Collective Memory and Political Behaviors

Activated History – The Case of the Turkish Sieges of Vienna

Christian Ochsner and Felix Roesel (Ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich Dresden Branch)

Abstract: We study whether long-gone but activated history can shape social attitudes and behavior even after centuries. We exploit the case of the sieges of Vienna in 1529 and 1683, when Turkish troops pillaged individual municipalities across East Austria. In 2005, Austrian right-wing populists started to campaign against Turks and Muslims and explicitly referred to the Turkish sieges. We show that right-wing voting increased in once pillaged municipalities compared to non-pillaged municipalities after the campaigns were launched, but not before. The effects are substantial: Around one out of ten votes for the far-right in a once pillaged municipality is caused by salient history. We conclude that campaigns can act as tipping points and catalyze history in a nonlinear fashion.

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6586&r=his

Circulated by NEP-HIS on: 2017-11-05

Revised by Martin Söderhäll (Uppsala University)

The_Turkish_Siege_of_Vienna

The Turkish Siege of Vienna (1529). Collection: Vienna Museum. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

a) Summary

Is it possible for “arguably irrelevant” historical events to shape the voting behavior of a population if triggered by political campaigning exploiting said historical events? This is the main question the authors set out to answer in the paper. The authors show that political campaigning that uses stereotypes of religious and ethnic minorities can be highly effective when encountering spatially embedded collective memory utilizing a set of seemingly unique historical and societal circumstances occurring in present day Austria, among other things: 1. The pillaging of Austrian villages by Turkish troops during the Ottoman military expeditions in the 16th and 17th centuries. 2. The presence of one of Europe’s oldest and still existing right-wing populist parties (the Freigeitliche Partei Österreich, FPÖ) which in 2005 started to campaign against Muslims and Turks explicitly referring to “their vicious crimes during the Turkish sieges of Vienna” and 3. The arguably exogenous location of the Battle of Bisamberg which led to spatial discontinuity in the probability of villages being pillaged by the Turks north of the Danube during the second siege of Vienna in 1683.

map

The empirical strategy is directed towards examining if the vote share of the Austrian right-wing populist party (FPÖ) was significantly higher in villages exposed to Turkish pillaging in the 16th and/or the 17th centuries (i.e. in villages were the collective memory of Turkish pillages was stronger) than in villages that were not pillaged, right after the change in campaign tactics of the FPÖ in the year 2005. Using the “tools of the trade” of 21st century economic historical research (the baseline model uses a traditional DiD approach, although the spatial fuzzy RD design using panel data, seen in section 4.3 is new according to the authors), Ochsner and Roesel find that having been exposed to pillaging in the 16th and the 17th centuries led to an activation effect (i.e. the average treatment effect) of 1.6-3.05 percent depending on the specification. The larger effect sizes, 2.5-3.05 percent are estimated using the spatial fuzzy RD design on the sub sample of villages west of Vienna.

 

The authors conclude that neither “a local historical record of foreign atrocities” or “a campaign that addresses the stereotypes of these foreigners” are necessary and sufficient conditions to activate any effect. However, when both conditions are met the effect is statistically significant and robust across a range of specifications. In section 7 of the paper the authors address the underlying mechanisms at work. Ochsner and Roesel find that the effects of the campaigning were stronger in small rural communities and in communities with a lower share of out-commuters. Their findings suggest that “collective memory is likely to be a function of local embeddedness”. The authors conclude their paper with a call for future research that addresses the fact that societies can evolve and interact in a non-linear manner.

b) Comments

In general, I tend to approach quasi-experimental long-run effects papers with seemingly robust and large effects on the treatment group, with a bit of skepticism. In this case however, at least from my point of view, the authors made an excellent job of convincing me of (at least) the internal validity of their study. This is in part thanks to the appealing empirical setting, which they carefully account for in the introduction, and the two following sections of the paper.  The use of pictures and references to visual remnants of history in East Austria as well as quotes of “anti-Turkish” comments in online forums and the analysis of FPÖ’s campaign content provides context to readers unfamiliar with the setting, which is great!

campaign

While I find the authors interpretation of the mechanisms at work plausible, the empirical examination of said mechanism lacks the attention to detail shown in section 4-6. Collective memory might well be a function of local embeddedness; however, the authors use the share of out-commuters from a village as a proxy for embeddedness. Arguably this variable could also be a proxy for a lot of other things such as the average income or the age structure of the population in the villages (which they do not control for in the models presented in table 13). Addressing the mechanisms at work more carefully would in my opinion further improve the paper.

As a final comment, the results provided by the authors raises many interesting questions. The possibility to activate history in places were a collective memory of past events is present by campaigning could be utilized by a range of actors. In this day and age when the costs for highly customized political advertising (on social media platforms for example) is lower than ever before, “activating history” could be utilized by political parties (or other interest groups) in locations were the probability of a positive effect is higher, whilst other (less controversial) campaigning strategies could be used in other locations. The fact that the authors implicitly raise the awareness of how distant history in subtle ways can influence our opinions is truly a good thing.

Environmental Shocks and their Effects on Imperial Rome’s State Capacity

Droughts of Dismay: Rainfall and Assassinations in Ancient Rome

By Cornelius Christian (Brock University) and Liam Elbourne (St. Francis Xavier University)

Abstract: We find that lower rainfall in north-central Europe (Gaul/Germania) predicts more assassinations of Roman emperors from 27 BC to 476 AD. Due to agricultural pressures on Germanic tribes, low precipitation caused more barbarian raids. These raids, in turn, weakened the Empire’s overall political stability, and reduced the costs of assassinating an emperor. We buttress our empirical analysis with case study evidence.

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:brk:wpaper:1703&r=his

Circulated by nep-his on 2017/10/08

Review by Fernando Arteaga (George Mason University)

 

Summary

Was Imperial Rome’s political stability disturbed by environmental shocks? If so, what were the transmission channels? These are the two fundamental questions the authors aim to answer. Their thesis is straightforward: As any pre-industrial society, rainfall levels predicted agricultural output in Roman times. A lack of rain affected food availability, especially in the underdeveloped regions where Northern Germanic Tribes resided, making these societies more prone to raid Roman towns across the border. The incursions then created political conflict among the Romans themselves.

colosseum

The text relies on econometric analyses and a couple of case studies to back up the argument. The main statistical test is simple: they regress Roman political stability on rainfall data. The main variable they use as a proxy of political unrest is the assassination of Roman emperors (as presented by Scarre 1995): the more emperors were killed, the less stability in the Empire. Alternatively, they also employ an index of inflation and new governmental infrastructure investment as a proxy for stability  (larger inflation and less imperial projects imply improved stability).  The rainfall variable comes from Buengten et al. (2011) own estimations on precipitation levels across France and Germany for all the period under study. Figure 1 displays the main data points used in the analysis. The authors find that negative rainfall shocks are both associated with more emperor’s being killed (Figure 2) and with having larger inflation rates and fewer investment projects. A decrease of one standard deviation in precipitation caused an 11.6% standard deviation increase in assassination probability. The regression is empirically valid because there is no possibility of reversal causality; precipitation is not a factor that may be influenced by Roman politics [1].

 

RomeFigure1

Figure 1: Roman Gaul/Germania (Yellow). Rainfall Datapoints (Green). Emperor Assassination Locations (Red)

 

 

RomeFigure2

Figure 2: The red line indicates the precipitation level, while the blue is the amount of Roman Emperors assassinated.

 

But how exactly does lack of rain destabilized Roman society? The paper’s hypothesis relies on the Germanic raid linkage: Germanic tribes attacked Rome when they had a poor harvest of their own, which then created unrest in Roman interior stability.  To test such assertion, they regress Germanic/Gaul incursions on the rainfall levels. The raid data they use comes from Venning (2010), who reviewed the many times the Roman Empire suffered raids through its history. The authors find a negative correlation: a decrease in one standard deviation in rainfall is associated with a 4% standard deviation increase in a number of raids. They corroborate the results by doing some robustness tests: 1) a placebo test, in which they regress non-Germanic raids on precipitation levels, which they find that had insignificant impact (which means that precipitation mattered only in Germanic zones, because they were the only ones that really suffered from a lack of rain); 2) an instrumental variable where the relationship between Roman instability and Germanic incursion is instrumented by rainfall. They find that “a standard deviation increase in the raid dummy [the presence of raiding] causes a 29.3% increase in the probability of assassination.”

To give more weight to their results, they present a brief recapitulation on the reigns of two assassinated Roman emperors: Severus Alexander (208-235) and Gallienus (218-268). The key insight is that both emperors faced important challenges on the Eastern and Northern borders, however only the latter had a relevant impact on Roman internal politics. On the East, the Roman Empire frequently collided with the Sassanid Empire (the other larger state in the area), but notwithstanding the severity of the clashes (at some point they even captured a Roman Emperor, the father of Gallienus) it never caused great civil unrest in Rome. However, on the North, Rome bordered the Germanic tribes (scattered non-organized societies) that did affect Rome’s stability.  The conclusion we get from the narrative is that the Germanic border was important/special precisely because it was very susceptible to environmental shocks, which then led to constant raiding; unlike the Sassanid border, in which the Romans faced a cohesive society that could successfully resist bad crops or confront military bravados on non-environmental factors.

 

Comment

I enjoyed reading the paper very much. It made me re-realize why I find Economic History fascinating: it deals with topics that are interesting in themselves (the politics of the Roman Empire! What is not to like about it?), that remain relevant for today’s problems (we still seek to understand the relationship between nature and political conflict very much), and it treats the issues under study with great care and humility (there is no grand universal theory, but a careful attempt to attain a reliable empirical finding- however small that is).

My main concern with the paper is that the authors never clarify the relationship between Northern Rome’s lack of state capacity and the barbarian incursions. The main narrative maintains that the Germanic raids were the source of Roman political unrest (that is the way I summarized the argument in the preceding section). But at several instances across the paper, the authors hint that Roman political complications in Gaul were themselves a precursory factor that made the Germanic incursions more menacing.

The problem is present in both the econometric analysis and in the case studies. If I understood it correctly (by looking at figure 1), the regressions they asses rely on data that captures rainfall in both Roman Gaul/Germania and non-Roman Germania. The argument is that lack of rain affected Germanic independent tribes more because they were less prepared than the Roman borderline towns. Intuitively, this sounds right. However, the assertion does not imply that alternative transmission channels could not matter too. Yes, Roman towns were better prepared to endure bad harvests than their Germanic neighbors, but that doesn’t imply that bad agricultural output in Roman towns could not be the cause of political instability in them. There may be a relevant omitted variable bias problem in the empirical specification. [2]

The problem seems clearer when we consider the conclusions the authors get from their case studies: in them, they compare the level of relevance local border town problems in Germania/Gaul and in Syria had on larger Roman politics. The Germanics were a constant thorn on Rome, but the Syrians weren’t. Why? The authors explicitly stress that Roman Gaul/Germania had lower state capacity than Roman territories next to Syria, and so it was easier to subdue unrest in Syria than in Gaul. However, if that is so, then we are led to beg the question of what causes what? Is weak state capacity due to raiding, or is raiding due to weak state capacity? The paper’s narrative emphasizes the former linkage (all of the quantitative estimations rely on that sole mechanism too) while, at the same time, it recognizes that the latter mattered too. Unfortunately, it never sets to disentangle the underlying causality. [3]

References

Buengten, Ulf et al. (2011)  “2,500 years of European climate variability and human
susceptibility.” Science, 331(6017), pp. 578-582

Scarre, Chris (1995) Chronicle of the Roman Emperors: The Reign-by-Reign Record of the Rulers of Imperial Rome. Thames & Hudson: London.

Scheidel, Walter (2015) “Orbis: the Stanford geospatial network model of the Roman world.” http://orbis.stanford.edu/

Venning, Timothy. (2010) A Chronology of the Roman Empire, Bloomsbury Academic: New York.

Endnotes

[1] The authors confirm this by regressing rainfall at time t on lagged t -1 political stability.  It is interesting to note that this obvious observation may not be true for current events. Climate change is indeed affected by the domestic politics of some countries.

[2] I also remain confused about what data was used for some of the alternative estimations. For example, on the placebo test, they regress non-Germanic raids on precipitation levels. I assume they are using non-Germanic precipitation levels too. Otherwise, it would mean they would be testing how rain in Germania affects raids in non-Germania, which would make no sense.  However, they don’t clarify.

[3] My two cents on the Syrian/Gaul distinction is that geography and travel times may explain it. ORBIS (A project that reenacts the geospatial framework of the Roman Empire) allows us to estimate the times and cost of regular trips to different cities in the Roman Empire. A trip from Rome to Cologne would last 32 days on the fastest route and 63 days on the cheapest. A trip from Rome to Palmyra, on the other hand, would last 28 on the fastest route and 42 on the cheapest. This can provide a benchmark of the cost of mobilizing resources across regions: moving a Roman army could be 1/3 cheaper if it had to go to Syria rather than Germania. This significative figure implies that the costs of subduing unrest in Germania were larger and so more difficult.

Computers and Business History: Mira Wilkins Prize Winner

IBM Rebuilds Europe: The Curious Case of the Transnational Typewriter
By Petri Paju (Turku) and Thomas Haigh (Wisconsin, Milwaukee).

Abstract: In the decade after the Second World War IBM rebuilt its European operations as integrated, wholly owned subsidiaries of its World Trade Corporation, chartered in 1949. Long before the European common market eliminated trade barriers, IBM created its own internal networks of trade, allocating the production of different components and products between its new subsidiaries. Their exchange relationships were managed centrally to ensure that no European subsidiary was a consistent net importer. At the heart of this system were eight national electric typewriter plants, each assembling parts produced by other European countries. IBM promoted these transnational typewriters as symbols of a new and peaceful Europe and its leader, Thomas J. Watson, Sr., was an enthusiastic supporter of early European moves toward economic integration. We argue that IBM’s humble typewriter and its innovative system of distributed manufacturing laid the groundwork for its later domination of the European computer business and provided a model for the development of transnational European institutions.

Enterprise & Society 17(2, June 2016): 265-300

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2015.64

URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/enterprise-and-society/article/ibm-rebuilds-europe-the-curious-case-of-the-transnational-typewriter/35D5A3FD95F5948F12754DBE07E9D89F

Free download (for limited time): https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-file-manager/file/59e769bb60a7c0f73791cd84

Review by James W. Cortada (Charles Babbage Institute, Minnesota)

Prizes are awarded all the time for “best article” in a particular field, calling our attention to a well-executed, thoughtful one. But, occasionally, a prize winning article signals bigger shifts in a discipline than might otherwise be noticed. With this year’s award of the Business History Conference’s “Mira Wilkins Prize,” for the best article published in Enterprise & Society, we have such a signal.

Petri Paju and Thomas Haigh wrote “IBM Rebuilds Europe: The Curious Case of the Transnational Typewriter,” published in June 2016. They were recognized for “the best article on international business history,” the objective of this prize, but it is far more than good international business history.

The article chronicles how IBM created an internal network across eight national electric typewriter plants in post-World War II Europe to manufacture parts and to assembly these products. While electric typewriters were in great demand and IBM made what many considered to be the best one, the company created an internal network for their manufacture and distribution that transcended international borders in the decade after the war, presaging what would happen for some European products after the establishment of the European Union. But that was never solely the point—to create a European-wide market by governments—rather, it was to drive down production costs, increase demand for and the ability to deliver enough machines, while promoting IBM management’s belief that “World Peace through World Trade” could be a global objective for nations and companies. The authors trace how parts were made in one country, shipped to another, put together then sold, called the “Interchange Plan.” This experience taught IBM management how to create a more formal pan-European wide, later worldwide organization in 1949 that could manufacture, sell, and support its products called IBM World Trade. Within a half generation, World Trade did as much business as the American side of IBM.

Lessons learned in forming a pan-European typewriter business made it possible for IBM to develop a pan-European computer business that quickly dominated the mainframe business in Western Europe and in other parts of the world. Just as important, when IBM moved into the computer business, it already had factories, sales offices, and experienced employees in those countries that would become its best customers. These include Great Britain, France, West Germany, the Nordics, Italy, Spain, and a sprinkling presence in every country that eventually became part of the EU. The authors explain how the company created and learned from its “Interchange Plan,” operationally and strategically. They explored the accounting level to explain how money and budgets were exchanged across borders when governments had yet to sort out those issues, let alone even allow such exchanges.

The benefits to IBM were both obvious and extraordinary. Obvious ones included reduced operating costs for the manufacture and increased sale of typewriters. Less obvious, but ultimately more important, “this system would also foster interdependence among the various national [IBM] firms,” while spreading capabilities across multiple countries so that if one nation were to nationalize or block local IBM production, as occurred during World War II, another plant could pick up the slack. The company used its system in its public relations campaign to promote international trade through American managerial leadership and “to meet the challenges of communism” in the Cold War. Other American corporations—all of them with close ties to IBM’s management—took note of what IBM was learning and applied those lessons as well. IBM’s country organizations could also claim to be local, since each employed nationals, Fins in Finland, French in France, and so forth.

The lesson urged by these two young historians is an appropriate one at the moment: “think more carefully about the assumption that postwar globalization of European trade can be reduced to ‘Americanization’,” because IBM’s experience reflected a “hybridization of U.S. technology and management in postwar Europe.” Apply their suggestion worldwide. IBM was also prepared to experiment and operate in ways that valued expansion into new markets even at the costs of profits. That is one reason why it came to dominate the mainframe market so fast and for so many decades. The wisdom of today’s corporate fixation on shareholder value is challenged by this study of how IBM ran its typewriter business.

Perhaps the greater lesson, the more significant observation for why this prize this year is so important, lies elsewhere. For the past two decades, a month has barely gone by without an historian or economist publishing on the interactions of computing technology and business management. E&S is not alone in doing so; Technology & Culture has published some two-dozen similar articles in the new century, and Information & Culture is rapidly becoming another journal with a mix of business/information technology conversations. Petri Paju and Thomas Haigh are more than two gifted prolific article writers, they are teaching a new generation of scholars how to understand the role of information technologies and of management, business operations, and corporate strategy in a world filled with computers. Simply put, this article is seminal, worthy of being studied across multiple disciplines. The Mira Wilkes Prize Committee is to be congratulated for not letting this paper slip through the cracks.

On the Long-term Determinants of Cultural Traits: Family Structures in the Past

Origins and Implications of Family Structure across Italian Provinces in Historical Perspective

By Graziella Bertocchi (Modena and Reggia Emilia University and IZA) and Monica Bozzano (Modena and Reggia Emilia University)

Abstract: In this study we review the literature on the origins and implications of family structure in historical perspective with a focus on Italian provinces. Furthermore we present newly collected data on three of the main features of family structure: female mean age at marriage, the female celibacy rate, and the fraction of illegitimate births. The data are collected at the provincial level for 1871, the year of Italy’s political unification. The analysis of the data allows us to confirm and quantify the geographic differentiation in family patterns across the country.
We also illustrate the links between family structure and a set of socio-economic outcomes, in the short, medium, and long run.

URL: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10327

Distributed by NEP-HIS on: 2017‒06‒25

Review by: Guido Alfani (Bocconi University, Milan)

The recent interest in the long-term determinants of cultural traits has led to a new wave of research on family systems in the past, as well as to debates that renewed old disputes about the actual possibility of identifying areas of coherent family systems and their causal effect on contemporary behaviours. Graziella Bertocchi and Monica Bozzano have been very active in this field, focusing on such a culturally fragmented and varied area as Italy. In this new working paper, they present further evidence at the provincial level from the Italian 1871 census. They show the importance of looking at the sub-national and indeed, at the sub-regional level to identify correctly the prevalent family structures and demographic behaviours. Their data show feeble evidence that the so-called EMP (European Marriage Pattern) is associated with economic development, human capital accumulation and women’s empowerment. These findings are relevant to current debates on European family systems and on their possible permanent effects on cultural traits.

ItalianFamily_earlyXXc

Italian Family, early twentieth-century. Source:  www.novecento.org.

Summary

This paper presents new data, at the provincial level, about family structures in Italy in 1871. In that year, the first national census was made after the conquest of Rome and the incorporation of the residual territories of the former Papal States, and Veneto, into the Kingdom of Italy. The authors provide information about family types, female age to marriage, proportion of brides under age 20, female final celibacy rates, and illegitimacy rates. Family types are classified as nuclear vs complex, as well as according to the four-way classification introduced by Todd (1990) which combines residential habits (neolocal vs patrilocal) and inheritance systems (partible vs impartible): absolute nuclear family, egalitarian nuclear family, stem family, and communitarian family. Additionally, the authors build upon earlier research (Bertocchi and Bozzano 2015) to apply their own classification of Italian families, which distinguishes between egalitarian families with late female age to marriage (found to be prevalent, in 1871, in the North-West of Italy), incomplete stem families (prevalent in the North-East), communitarian families (prevalent in the Centre) and egalitarian families with early age to marriage (prevalent in the South).
Beyond the technicalities of the classification, an important contribution of the article is to clearly show, by means of a set of well-drawn maps, the high variability of family types and behaviours to be found across the Italian peninsula, even in contiguous territories. The obvious consequence of this, is to make it much more difficult to neatly characterize different parts of Italy according to their family systems and prevalent demographic behaviours.
Interestingly, the authors focus on characteristics connected to the so-called European Marriage Pattern (EMP), including nuclear residential patterns, relatively late age to marriage and relatively high final celibacy rates. The prevalence of the EMP has been connected to economic success, as originally hypothesized by Hajnal (1965) and as later assumed by many economic historians and economists (for example, Greif 2006; De Moor and Van Zanden 2010). But in this paper, in the authors’ words, “Overall our results show very feeble evidence that the different characteristics of the EMP are associated with economic development, human capital accumulation, or women’s empowerment” (p. 14). However, the authors do find a significant correlation between some of their indicators and measures of contemporary gender balance. For example, gender equality in economic leadership (measured as the rate of women in managerial positions) in year 2009 is found to grow with the female mean age to marriage in 1871 and to decline with the proportion of brides under age 20 and the prevalence of nuclear families. This is in line with earlier research by Bozzano (2016).
The authors are mindful of placing correctly their discussion in the broader context of current research on the long-term impact of family systems and structures done by economic historians and economists. Consequently they provide to all researchers interested in the field a useful survey of the recent literature (although a better coverage of recent demographic and historical-demographic literature would also have been useful – see for example Reher 1998).

Comment

This paper is an interesting and important contribution to the renewed pan-European research efforts aimed at identifying the characteristics of past family systems. Although many researchers pursue this objective solely to improve our knowledge of the past, others are driven by the aim of finding long-term determinants of differences in current social and economic behaviour. Two examples of this are the “Patriarchy Index” project (Szołtysek et al. 2017) and the recently-started Institutional Family Demography project (IFAMID) led by Arnstein Aassve, which is currently focusing on the measurement of another of Hajnal’s favoured indicators, the prevalence of life-cycle servants, at the European sub-national level. Yet other scholars have analysed previously-neglected aspects of past societies which could also explain current behaviour – for example godparenthood practices, which began to diverge across Europe at the time of the Reformation and which might have led to differences in ways of doing business (Alfani and Gourdon 2012).
The sub-national scale of analysis is a particularly useful characteristic of this paper. First, it allows (at least on principle) for more precise measurement and greater explanatory power. Secondly, and maybe even more importantly, it reminds us that complexity in the geographic distribution of social systems and behaviours is the common feature of most of the European continent. Indeed, a seemingly frequent characteristic of old debates is that they are easily forgotten – and what might have seemed to be final acquisitions need to be re-discovered and re-discussed, decades later. This is the case of debates about the actual possibility of applying broad generalizations to studies of European social-economic dynamics, the most common of which, both when referring to the European continent, or to Italy alone, seems to be the “North vs South” one. Such debates already involved, in a somewhat defensive position, Peter Laslett and his school, but have been renewed due to the popularity acquired by Todd’s more recent classifications among economists and to some degree among economic historians (interestingly, Todd seems to have been much less influential on historians of the family). The debates about the role played by the EMP in determining economic success, which have recently been the object of intense discussion in the pages of the Journal of Economic History (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014; 2016; Carmichael et al. 2016), have old roots. It is still unclear where current discussion will lead us – whether we are bound to conclude that if we examine European family systems closely, they are in fact too diverse and intermixed to be of much use as indicators of persistent cultural divides, or whether we will finally reach a consensus on broad, documentable differences which do not only fit nicely with our views on European societies (even though such views might be more than a little tainted by prejudice and ideology), but do actually explain something. What is clear is that, in order to make the discussion progress in a fruitful way, we need more high-quality data – which is what this paper successfully delivers for Italy.
There are, of course, issues which might be debated further. For example, this paper (like most of its kind) does not discuss the choice of period to measure differences in past family systems. It is not enough to state that the earliest-available encompassing census is used – is 1871 also the right period to measure such differences? Were not family differences already influenced by the Industrial Revolution and the demographic transition, and were not these processes more advanced at that time in the North (and especially in the North-West) than in the South of Italy? And why did the authors not control in their regression analysis for the pre-unification Italian state to which each province belonged, given that they work on a period immediately following the birth of the Kingdom of Italy? Indeed, why should we rule out the possibility that pre-unification states also had permanent effects, perhaps due to some influence on their local family systems? Finally, how far could family systems in 1871 determine differences in cultural traits today, given the intense internal migration processes that affected Italy? Many northern regions today have a very mixed population if we consider where the current population’s ancestors lived in 1871. Should we not conclude that current cultural traits are better explained by past family systems in provinces of out-migration (mostly the southern ones) compared with those of in-migration (mostly the northern ones)? And how could we take this into account, if indeed it is possible?
But these are questions better left for further research and for future debates, which already seem to be looming on the horizon. For now, we should be grateful to the authors of this paper for providing us with new material to ponder.

Selected bibliography

Alfani, G. and Gourdon, V. (2012), “Entrepreneurs, formalization of social ties, and trustbuilding in Europe (fourteenth to twentieth centuries)”, Economic History Review 65 (3), pp. 1005–1028
Bertocchi, G. and M. Bozzano (2015),“Family Structure and the Education Gender Gap: Evidence from Italian Provinces,” CESifo Economic Studies 61, pp. 263–300.
Bozzano, M. (2016), “On the Historical Roots of Women’s Empowerment across Italian Provinces: Religion or Family Culture?”, European Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming.
Carmichael, S. G., De Pleijt, A., van Zanden, J.L. and De Moor, T. (2016), “The European Marriage Pattern and Its Measurement”, Journal of Economic History 76, pp. 196–204.
De Moor, T. and J. L. van Zanden (2010), “Girlpower: The European Marriage Pattern and Labour Markets in the North Sea Region in the Late Medieval and Early Modern Period”, Economic History Review 63, pp. 1–33.
Dennison, T. and S. Ogilvie (2014), “Does the European Marriage Pattern Explain Economic Growth?”, Journal of Economic History 74, pp. 651–693.
Dennison, T. and S. Ogilvie (2016), “Institutions, Demography, and Economic Growth”, Journal of Economic History 76, pp. 215–217.
Greif, A. (2006), “Family Structure, Institutions, and Growth: The Origins and Implications of Western Corporations”, American Economic Review 96, pp. 308–312.
Hajnal, J. (1965), “European Marriage Patterns in Perspective”, in D. V. Glass and D. E. C. Eversley (eds.), Population in History: Essays in Historical Demography, Edward Arnold, London, pp. 101–143.
Reher, D.S. (1998), “Family ties in Western Europe: Persistent Contrasts”, Population and Development Review 24, pp. 203-234
Szołtysek, M., Poniat, R., Gruber, S., Klüsener, S. (2017), “The Patriarchy Index: a new measure of gender and generational inequalities in the past”, Cross-Cultural Research 51 (3), pp. 1-35
Todd, E. (1990), L’Invention de l’Europe. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.