Category Archives: Britain

No man can serve two masters

Rogue Trading at Lloyds Bank International, 1974: Operational Risk in Volatile Markets

By Catherine Schenk (Glasgow)

Abstract Rogue trading has been a persistent feature of international financial markets over the past thirty years, but there is remarkably little historical treatment of this phenomenon. To begin to fill this gap, evidence from company and official archives is used to expose the anatomy of a rogue trading scandal at Lloyds Bank International in 1974. The rush to internationalize, the conflict between rules and norms, and the failure of internal and external checks all contributed to the largest single loss of any British bank to that time. The analysis highlights the dangers of inconsistent norms and rules even when personal financial gain is not the main motive for fraud, and shows the important links between operational and market risk. This scandal had an important role in alerting the Bank of England and U.K. Treasury to gaps in prudential supervision at the end of the Bretton Woods pegged exchange-rate system.

Business History Review, Volume 91 (1 – April 2017): 105-128.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007680517000381

Review by Adrian E. Tschoegl (The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania)

Since the 1974 rogue trading scandal at Lloyds’s Lugano branch we have seen more spectacular sums lost in rogue trading scandals. What Dr Catherine Schenk brings to our understanding of these recurrent events is the insight that only drawing on archives, both at Lloyds and at the Bank of England, can bring. In particular, the archives illuminate the decision processes at both institutions as the crisis unfolded. I have little to add to her thorough exposition of the detail so below I will limit myself to imprecise generalities.

Marc Colombo, the rogue trader at Lloyds Lugano, was a peripheral individual in a peripheral product line, in a peripheral location. As Schenk finds, this peripherality has two consequences, the rogue trader’s quest for respect, and the problem of supervision. Lloyds Lugano is not an anomaly. An examination of several other cases (e.g. Allied Irish, Barings, Daiwa, and Sumitomo Trading), finds the same thing (Tschoegl 2004).

In firms, respect and power come from being a revenue center. Being a cost center is the worst position, but being a profit center with a mandate to do very little is not much better. The rogue traders that have garnered the most attention, in large part because of the scale of their losses were not malevolent. They wanted to be valued. They were able to get away with their trading for long enough to do serious damage because of a lack of supervision, a lack that existed because of the traders’ peripherality.

In several cases, Colombo’s amongst them, the trader was head of essentially a one-person operation that was independent of the rest of the local organization. That meant that the trader’s immediate local supervisor had little or no experience with trading. Heads of branches in a commercial bank come from commercial banking, especially commercial lending. Commercial lending is a slow feedback environment (it may take a long time for a bad decision to manifest itself), and so uses a system of multiple approvals. Trading is a fast feedback environment. The two environments draw different personality types and have quite different procedures, with the trading environment giving traders a great deal of autonomy within set parameters, an issue Schenk addresses and that we will discuss shortly.

Commonly, traders will report to a remote head of trading and to the local branch manager, with the primary line being to the head of trading, and the secondary line being to the local branch manager. This matrix management developed to address the problem of the need to manage and coordinate centrally but also respond locally, but matrix management has its limitations too. As Mathew points out in the New Testament, “No man can serve two masters, for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other” (Matthew (6:24). Even short of this, the issue that can arise, as it did at Lloyds Luggano, is that the trader is remote from both managers, one because of distance (and often time zone), and the other because of unfamiliarity with the product line. A number of software developments have improved the situation since 1974, but as some recent scandals have shown, they are fallible. Furthermore, the issue still remains that at some point the heads of many product lines will report to someone who rose in a different product line, which brings up the spectre of “too complex to manage”.

The issue of precautionary or governance rules, and their non-enforcement, is a clear theme in Schenk’s paper. Like the problem of supervision, this too is an issue where one can only do better or worse, but not solve. All rules have their cost. The largest may be an opportunity cost. Governance rules exist to reduce variance, but that means the price of reducing bad outcomes is the lower occurrence of good outcomes. While it is true, as one of Schenk’s interviewees points out, that one does not hear of successful rogue traders being fired, that does not mean that firms do not respond negatively to success. I happened to be working for SBCI, an investment banking arm of Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC), at the time of SBC’s acquisition in 1992 of O’Connor Partners, a Chicago-based derivatives trading house. I had the opportunity to speak with O’Conner’s head of training when O’Connor stationed a team of traders at SBCI in Tokyo. He said that the firm examined too large wins as intently as they examined too large losses: in either case an unexpectedly large outcome meant that either the firm had mis-modelled the trade, or the trader had gone outside their limits. Furthermore, what they looked for in traders was the ability to walk away from a losing bet.

But even small costs can be a problem for a small operation. When I started to work for Security Pacific National Bank in 1976, my supervisor explained my employment benefits to me. I was authorized two weeks of paid leave per annum. When I asked if I could split up the time he replied that Federal Reserve regulations required that the two weeks be continuous so that someone would have to fill in for the absent employee. Even though most of the major rogue trading scandals arose and collapsed within a calendar year, the shadow of the future might well have discouraged the traders, or led them to reveal the problem earlier. Still, for a one-person operation, management might (and in some rogue trading scandals did), take the position that finding someone to fill in and bring them in on temporary duty was unnecessarily cumbersome and expensive. After all, the trader to be replaced was a dedicated, conscientious employee, witness his willingness to forego any vacation.

Lastly, there is the issue of Chesterton’s Paradox (Chesterton 1929). When a rule has been in place for some time, there may be no one who remembers why it is there. Reformers will point out that the rule or practice is inconvenient or costly, and that it has never in living memory had any visible effect. But as Chesterton puts it, “This paradox rests on the most elementary common sense. The gate or fence did not grow there. It was not set up by somnambulists who built it in their sleep. It is highly improbable that it was put there by escaped lunatics who were for some reason loose in the street. Some person had some reason for thinking it would be a good thing for somebody. And until we know what the reason was, we really cannot judge whether the reason was reasonable.”

Finally, an issue one needs to keep in mind in deciding how much to expend on prevention is that speculative trading is a zero-sum activity. A well-diversified shareholder who owns both the employer of the rogue trader and the employers of their counterparties suffers little loss. The losses to Lloyds Lugano were gains to, inter alia, Crédit Lyonnais.

There is leakage. Some of the gainers are privately held hedge funds and the like. Traders at the counterparties receive bonuses not for skill but merely for taking the opposite side of the incompetent rogue trader’s orders. Lastly, shareholders of the rogue traders firm suffer deadweight losses of bankruptcy when the firm, such as Barings, goes bankrupt. Still, as Krawiec (2000) points out, for regulators the social benefit of preventing losses to rogue traders may not exceed the cost. To the degree that costs matter to managers, but not shareholders, managers should bear the costs via reduced salaries.

References

Chesterton, G. K. (1929) ‘’The Thing: Why I Am A Catholic’’, Ch. IV: “The Drift From Domesticity”.

Krawiec, K.D. (2000): “Accounting for Greed: Unraveling the Rogue Trader Mystery”, Oregon Law Review 79 (2):301-339.

Tschoegl, A.E. (2004) “The Key to Risk Management: Management”. In Michael Frenkel, Ulrich Hommel and Markus Rudolf, eds. Risk Management: Challenge and Opportunity (Springer-Verlag), 2nd Edition;

Little Britain? Empire and the rise of protectionism in interwar Britain.

When Britain turned inward: Protection and the shift towards Empire in interwar Britain

By Alan de Bromhead (Queen’s University Belfast), Alan Fernihough (Queen’s University Belfast), Markus Lampe (Vienna University of Economics and Business) and Kevin Hjortshøj O’Rourke (University of Oxford)

International trade became much less multilateral during the 1930s. Previous studies, looking at aggregate trade flows, have argued that discriminatory trade policies had comparatively little to do with this. Using highly disaggregated information on the UK’s imports and trade policies, we find that policy can explain the majority of Britain’s shift towards Imperial imports in the 1930s. Trade policy mattered, a lot.

URL http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/nbrnberwo/23164.htm

Distributed by NEP-HIS on: 2017-03-20

Reviewed by Mark J Crowley

This paper provides an interesting insight into tariffs, and their role in interwar Britain from a perspective that has not been previously examined.  An examination of this issue is timely, especially with the debates surrounding the implication of Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union, and the threats issued by the American Trump administration concerning future trade policy.  It demonstrates that the impact of tariffs during the economic crises of the 1930s had a variable impact, and did not always achieve their intended outcome.  In this respect, the impact of punitive trade policies from a historical perspective can provide a very important context to future negotiations as the world becomes acclimatised to a very different political landscape.

Tariff reform was a huge issue for the British government in the early twentieth century, and the subject of significant political propaganda.

The paper is deeply researched, and draws on a wide collection of data.  One of the main conclusions is that trade blocs made very little difference, nor did the imperial preference scheme, to the balance and nature of the British economy in the crisis years.  However, it does show that the change in the nature of trade, away from free trade to focusing specifically on empire did have specific outcomes that shaped the direction of the British economy, but that these changes were caused specifically by trade policy rather than anything else.  Indeed, the authors show that as a result of the changing nature of the British government’s trade policy, a 70% increase in empire trade was reported in the period 1930-33.  In this respect, the paper poses a very interesting question that is addressed, but will need further historical enquiry:  Did trade policy contribute to return of intra-Imperial trade?

The paper looks at a range of policies pursued by the British government in the period after the First World War, some of which were discriminatory, in order to evaluate the nature of its economic and trade development.  In compiling their conclusions, a huge amount of data was analysed, including data sets from 42 countries examining 200 products categories between 1924-1938.   The data showed that dramatic changes were seen in the nature of Britain’s trade and economic policy in the period 1931-33.  Nevertheless, these changes had long roots.  The abolition of free trade after the First World War saw the introduction of the McKenna Duty, which imposed a 33.5% tariff on cars, clocks, watches, films and musical instruments ad valorem (based on the value of the goods).  This was later intensified with the implementation of the 1921 Safeguarding of Industries Act, where a 33.5% tariff was placed on the imports of key goods.  However, despite the apparent punitive nature of these policies, the British economy was largely Liberal up to 1930, when the Abnormal Importations Act allowed 100% tax on all manufactured goods from outside the empire.

tr2

Utilising goods from the empire was seen as an excellent opportunity for the British government to stablilise its economy during the challenges of the Great Depression.

Realising the potential difficulties that such a punitive law could unleash, a more compassionate deal was reached in the 1932 Import Duties Act, where it was agreed that a 10% tax be imposed on imported goods, although this exempted products from the empire.  This concession was achieved with the aim of ensuring improved access to dominion markets, and resulted in several bilateral agreements with Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Newfoundland, India and Southern Rhodesia.  Nevertheless, with the introduction of quotas for agricultural products through the Agricultural Marketing Acts of 1931 and 1933, there were now restrictions on the type of farming products that could be imported.  Moreover, in a tone that is reminiscent of the pro-Brexit camp both during and after the referendum, the British explored deals that went beyond the traditional confines of Europe in order to strengthen its economy, and this included Scandinavian countries and Argentina.  This not only improved British trade prospects, but provided the mutually-beneficial element to these countries in order to maintain access to the British market for the purpose of trade.

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The 1932 Import Duties Act was seen by many as symbolic of punitive protectionist policies pursued by the British government.

Critique

There are so many fantastic elements to this paper that not only shed new light on the issue of tariffs, but also provide the foundation for future debate.  Nevertheless, the authors have highlighted what they believed were the difficulties in their research, especially concerning the masses of data that they collected.  They believed that there were inconsistencies in the data, but have done a wonderful job in using spreadsheets to predict the results in the absence of concrete data.  In some cases, the use of complicated mathematical formulas has been used to come to these conclusions.  The fact that the paper engages in counterfactual debate provides an important foundation for future discussion, but also lends itself to its own difficulties.  Counterfactuals, although interesting, cannot be definitively proven.   In this respect, the paper poses several “what if” questions relating to tariffs, especially what would have happened if tariffs had not been increased.  In their conclusions, they argue that it appears that the empire did better with tariffs than without, and if there was free trade, there would only have been a modest increase in the empire share of trade.  Thus, the impact of British protectionist policies proved substantial, and, they argue, account for a shift of around 50% of trade towards the empire by 1930.   The conclusions are interesting and useful, but as the authors explain, a lot of work needed to be done to fill the gaps in the data.  It is the interpretation of these gaps in the data, especially the ways in which some conclusions have been reached through the use of counterfactual debate that will undoubtedly provide the platform for future historical enquiry on this topic.

References

Eichengreen, Barry, and Douglas A. Irwin. The slide to protectionism in the Great Depression: Who succumbed and why?. No. w15142. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009.

Capie, Forrest. Depression & Protectionism: Britain Between the Wars. Vol. 2. Routledge, 2013.

Temin, Peter. Lessons from the great depression. MIT Press, 1991.

Accounting for Deception in the Industrial Revolution

Creative accounting in the British Industrial Revolution: Cotton manufacturers and the ‘Ten Hours’ Movement

By Steve Toms and Alice Shepherd (both at the University of Leeds Business School)

Abstract

The paper examines an early case of creative accounting, and how, during British industrialization, accounting was enlisted by the manufacturers’ interest to resist demands, led by the ‘Ten hours’ movement, for limiting the working day. In contrast to much of the prior literature, which argues that entrepreneurs made poor use of accounting techniques in the British industrial revolution, the paper shows that there was considerable sophistication in their application to specific purposes, including political lobbying and accounting for the accumulation of capital. To illustrate lobbying behaviour, the paper examines entrepreneurs’ use of accounting to resist the threat of regulation of working time in textile mills. It explains why accounting information became so important in the debate over factory legislation. In doing so, it shows that a significant element was the accounting evidence of one manufacturer in particular, Robert Hyde Greg, which had a strong impact on the outcome of the parliamentary process. The paper uses archival evidence to illustrate how accounting was used in Greg’s enterprise and the reality of its economic performance. The archival evidence of actual performance is then contrasted with the figures presented by Greg to the Factories Inquiry Commission, convened by the House of Commons in 1833-1834 to hear witnesses from the manufacturing interest. These sets of figures are compared and contrasted and discrepancies noted. Conclusions show that the discrepancies were substantial, motivated by Greg’s incentives to present a particular view of low profits, high fixed costs, and the threat of cheaper overseas competition. The figures appeared to lend some credibility to the apparent plight of manufacturers and to Nassau Senior’s flawed argument about all profit being earned in the ‘last hour’ of the working day. The consequence was a setback for the Ten Hours movement, leading to a further intensification of political struggles over working conditions in the 1840s.

URL: http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/pramprapa/51478.htm

Review by Masayoshi Noguchi

The paper by Toms and Shepherd was distributed by NEP-HIS on 2013-11-22. It makes a welcomed contribution to researching the role of accounting information within the British Industrial Revolution, as great debate still continues over the extent to which accounting technology was used for management decision making during that period.

The aim of Toms and Shepherd is to examine “the use of accounting by entrepreneurs to resist the threat of regulation of working time in textile mills in the early 1830s” (p. 2). This by analyzing the extent of “anti-regulation lobbying on working hours and child labour was influenced by accounting manipulation” (p. 2).

Archival evidence was sourced in the business records of the partnerships of Samuel H. Greg and Sons. As is well known, one distinctive feature of accounting system of partnerships until present day is profit-sharing amongst principals. Toms and Shepherd also examines in detail the level of “sophistication in recording capital appropriations and accumulations” (p. 4) among partners. This as the partnerships’ accounting system recognised implied interest charges of capital and used them to arrive at the balance carried forward. However, this criteria sharply contrasted with the absence of any other criteria for accounting for fixed assets (including depreciation). Fixed assets were treated as part of “[Greg’s] private estate and not assigned to the partnership” (p. 14). The practice at Greg and Sons thus provides a further case to support Pollard’s critical assessment of the limited use of accounting information for decision purposes (p.14).

Business records recording the actual performance of the business are then contrasted with evidence submitted by Robert Hyde Greg to the Factories Inquiry Commission of 1833. Toms and Shepherd then argue that the latter accounting evidence was distorted by the manufacturer’s interest to oppose the introduction of regulation stipulating the working day in textile factories. In particular, Greg manipulated accounting evidence submitted to the Factories Inquiry Commission by exaggerating “the importance of wages as an expense” (p. 22). This by assuming that most of the production costs in general, and wages in particular, were fixed costs and thus “reducing the working day would increase the burden of fixed charges” (p. 21) on profit.

Robert Hyde Greg (1795-1875)

Using the information recorded in Greg’s accounts of the partnership, Toms and Shepherd offer some factual and contra-factual exercises, including the calculation of “implied” rate of return on capital (pp.32-33). They then compare these results with the evidence provided by Greg to the Commission thus providing clear evidence of the manufacturer’s accounting manipulation. However, as the authors themselves admit, the concept of “return on capital is not referred to specifically in Greg’s evidence (only ratios of profit to output)” (p. 31), even though “the committee (sic) could easily draw conclusions from his tabulated appendices” (p. 31). Personally I would like to know more about the effect of writing-off the asset values exercised in 1832 (pp. 27, 30) on Greg’s submission of the accounting evidence to the commission in 1933.

With the skilled manipulation, the evidence submitted by Greg was successful to achieve a political effect with the final report of the Commission incorporated the entrepreneurs’ argument against the regulation on working hours. The authors conclude that accounting information could be used “not so much as an aid to [rational] management decisions, but as a [opportunistic] means of influencing others” (p. 36).

“As in the modern world.” Foreign and Domestic Equities in the London Stock Exchange, 1869-1928

Interior of the London Exchange, The Illustrated London News, March 25, 1854.

Interior of the London Exchange, The Illustrated London News, March 25, 1854.

Bloody Foreigners! Overseas Equity on the London Stock Exchange, 1869-1928.

by Richard S. Grossman, Wesleyan University (rgrossman@wesleyan.edu)
Abstract: This paper presents data on quantity, capital gains, dividend, and total returns for domestic and overseas equities listed on the London Stock Exchange during 1869-1928. Indices are presented for Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, North America, Australia/New Zealand and for the finance, transportation, raw materials, and utilities sectors in each region. Returns and volatility were typically highest in emerging regions and the raw materials sector. Dividend yields were similar across regions and differences in total returns were due largely to disparities in capital gains. Returns of firms in more industrial markets were relatively highly correlated with each other and with developing regions with which they had substantial colonial or trade connections. Contingent liability was most extensively employed where leverage was high and the physical assets were either meager or inaccessible to creditors.

URL: http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/wesweswpa/2014-001.htm

“The nominal value of the securities listed [in the London Stock Exchange] went from £2.3 billion in 1873 to £11.3 billion in 1913; in other words, more than the New York Stock Exchange and the Paris Bourse combined. As evidence of its highly cosmopolitan character, foreign stocks, which represented between 35% and 45% of the total in 1873, exceeded 50% from 1893 onwards. By 1914 one-third of all negotiable instruments in the world were quoted on the London Stock Exchange” (Cassis 2007: 98)
Since it was established in 1801 and most notably during the period commonly referred as the first globalization, the London exchange was the most important market for securities in the world. In this paper, distributed by NEP-HIS on 2014-01-17, Richard Grossman presents an analysis of newly assembled data on UK and foreign equities listed in the London Stock Exchange between 1869 and 1928.
The study of the performance of equities in London by Grossman offers an unparalleled register of the rhythms of the world economy, from the late nineteenth century until the start of the Great Depression. It thus offers an excellent portrait of the role of the London equities market as the chief financial intermediary for capital flows within the British empire and the rest of the world.
Data to construct annual equities indicators from 1869 to 1929 was sourced from the  Investor’s Monthly Manual, which was digitized by the International Center for Finance (ICF) at the Yale School of Management. Grossman describes with detail the problems of determining the industrial sector of each firm in question, the criteria used by the staff of the Manual and the ICF to ascertain the domestic or foreign nature of the firms therein listed, and accounting issues arising from several other situations, such as a share’s volume of trade and differences between the nominal and market value of shares at different points in time. Grossman uses end-of-January data from 77,248 observations of equity securities, as “equity, a claim on firm profits, may be more likely to reflect expectations about future corporate profits than bonds” (Grossman 2014: 4).

To patent or not to patent, that is the question

Inventors, Patents and Inventive Activities in the English Brewing Industry, 1634-1850

Alessandro Nuvolari (alessandro.nuvolari@sssup.it) and James Sumner (james.sumner@manchester.ac.uk)

URL: http://ideas.repec.org/p/ssa/lemwps/2012-18.html

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between patents, appropriability strategies and market for technologies in the English brewing industry before 1850. Previous research has pointed to the apparent oddity that large-scale brewing in this period was characterized both by a self-aware culture of rapid technological innovation, and by a remarkably low propensity to patent. Our study records how brewery innovators pursued a wide variety of highly distinct appropriability strategies, including secrecy, selective revealing, patenting, and open innovation and knowledge-sharing for reputational reasons. All these strategies could co-exist, although some brewery insiders maintained a suspicion of the promoters of patent technologies which faded only in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, we find evidence that sophisticated strategies of selective revealing could support trade in inventions even without the use of the patent system.

Review by Chris Colvin

Much about the recent legal dispute between Apple and Samsung suggests that our patent system is broken. The conventional economic argument for patent protection is that it is socially beneficial because it: (1) incentivises invention in areas where there would otherwise be few rewards for inventors; and (2) aids in the dissemination of ideas and combats secrecy (for a good explanation of the conventional view, see Suzanne Scotchmer’s excellent textbook). But in their 2008 polemic, and again in a recent working paper, Michele Boldrin and David K Levine argue that patents create only ‘an “intellectual monopoly” that hinders rather than helps the competitive free market regime that has delivered wealth and innovation to our doorsteps’. The authors argue instead that: (1) patents neither increase invention, nor adequately reward inventors; and (2) patents simply create a market in patents and in associated legal services.

Nuvolari and Sumner try to understand the remarkably low propensity to patent in brewing before 1850.

It is against this on-going debate on the value and efficacy of patent protection that Alessandro Nuvolari and James Sumner’s new working paper should be read. Distributed on NEP-HIS-2012-11-03, the paper offers an excellent industry case study from history with which to understand the role of patents within a single sector. Nuvolari (Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa) and Sumner (University of Manchester) track their use in the brewing industry before, during and after the Industrial Revolution. Not only do they compile a new dataset of patents and patentees in brewing across the period, but they also catalogue alternative appropriability strategies used by innovators at the time: trade secrecy, complete openness, and everything between. Of particular interest to economists and historians studying innovation and incentives are the authors’ findings that the strategies of “insiders” and “outsiders” to the brewing industry differed substantially, and that there was a large trade in inventions, even for those that were not protected by patents.

Today, and with few exceptions, we have a one-size-fits-all patent system that offers the same levels of protection to inventors in all sectors of the economy. One mooted solution to our current patent mess is that these government-granted monopoly rights should be redesigned to be sector-specific; they are perhaps more appropriate to some industries than others and should have different protection lengths, breadths and costs to reflect this. For example, patents that relate to tablet computers should be weakened, whilst those relating to pharmaceuticals strengthened. Nuvolari and Sumner give us a warning shot from history for policymakers considering such an approach: a great deal of different appropriability strategies can be present even within the same industrial sector, let alone between sectors. Redesigning today’s patent system to be sector-specific would fail to reflect the different ways in which inventors compete; it may force rivals to use the same strategies, and may hamper rather than help progress.

Human Resources in Great Britain in the Long Run, 1871-2011

Population, Migration and Labour Supply: Great Britain 1871 – 2011

Timothy J. Hatton (Australian National University) (tim.hatton@anu.edu.au)

URL http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:auu:hpaper:004&r=his

Abstract
A country’s most important asset is its people. This paper outlines the development of Britain’s human resources since the middle of the 19th century. It focuses on four key elements. The first is the demographic transition – the processes through which birth rates and death rates fell, leading to a slowdown in population growth. The second is the geographical reallocation of population through migration. This includes emigration and immigration as well as migration within Britain. The third issue is labour supply: the proportion of the population participating in the labour market and the amount and type of labour supplied. Related to this, the last part of the chapter charts the growth in education and skills of the population and the labour force.

Review by Anna Missiaia

This work by Tim Hatton was distributed by NEP-HIS on 2012-07-29 and deals with the evolution of population, labour force and human capital in Britain over the last 140 years. It is part of the upcoming third edition of the Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain edited by Roderick Floud, Paul Johnson and Jane Humphries. The author of this paper is one of the most known scholars when it comes to British labour history. The paper neatly illustrates the main trends in the evolution of human capital in Britain in the long run.

The first trend is the one of population. British population tripled over this period, predominately due to the increase in the number of the over 60 population. The reduction in deaths was due to the reduction in infectious diseases.  This change in the age structure is typical of demographic transitions experienced by industrializing countries. Nowadays, the main cause of death is chronic conditions that are also responsible of the increased number of years spent in disability. As for the fertility transition, Hatton claims that it was not caused by the decrease in infant mortality (and therefore the need to have fewer children in order to ensure support in old age). On the contrary, Hatton claims that a shift in preferences for smaller and better off family took place and was enabled by more awareness of birth control.

The second trend is the shift of Britain from an emigration to an immigration country. Emigration was in general connected to fluctuations in the business cycle abroad and the author estimates that the without emigration, real wages would have been about 12% lower. The reversal took place in the 1980s due to a mix of changes in institutional factors and economic incentives. Countries such as the US, Canada and Australia abolished the preference for British migrants and Britain facilitated the migration of Commonwealth citizens.

As for the condition of the labour force, the participation of women increased and the one of people over 65 decreased. There are two hypotheses on why women stayed out of the labour market until the 1930s: economic choice or social norms hostile to women labour. In the first case the decrease in the number of children to take care of should have led to an increase in participation, which did not occur for a long time after the beginning of the fertility transition. According to Hatton, women empowerment led to the overcoming of social norms. In general, the number of hours worked decreased from 60 per week to 36 from the 1980s on. This was possible because of the increase in real wages that allowed workers to work fewer hours.

Finally, education became universal through the expansion of public schooling and higher education (especially in professional subjects). For women, the attainment of a higher level of education was functional to the larger participation in the labour force. In conclusion, this paper gives an excellent overview on different topics in British labour history. It connects the different dimensions (population, labour force, migration, schooling) within one framework and proposes the author’s view on several debated issues.

In Antitrust We (Do Not) Trust

British economists on competition policy (1890-1920)

By Nicola Giocoli (giocoli@mail.jus.unipi.it), University of Pisa

URL: http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/pramprapa/39245.htm

Abstract

Most late 19th-century US economists gave a rather cool welcome to the Sherman Act (1890) and, though less harshly, to the Clayton and FTC Acts (1914). A large literature has identified several explanations for this surprising attitude, calling into play the relation between big business and competition, a non-neoclassical notion of competition and a weak understanding of anti-competitive practices. Much less investigated is the reaction of British economists to the passing of antitrust statutes in the U.S. What we know is simply that none of them (including the top dog, Alfred Marshall) championed the adoption of a law-based competition policy during the three decades (1890-1920) of most intense antitrust debates in the U.S. The position of three prominent British economists will be examined in this paper: H.S. Foxwell, D.H. MacGregor, and, of course, Alfred Marshall – the latter in two moments at the extremes of our period, 1890 and 1919. It will turn out that they all shared with their American colleagues a theoretical and operational skepticism about the government and judiciary interference with the free working of markets. They also believed that British industrial structure and business habits were so different from those in the U.S. that the urge of interfering with markets in order to preserve competition was much weaker. Among the paper’s insights is that Marshall’s key concept of “defending a competitor’s right to compete” foreran the modern characterization of the goal of competition policy as “the protection of the competitive process”. Yet Marshall developed his concept without making recourse to the post-1930s neoclassical notion of competition as a static market structure which lies at the foundation of most contemporary antitrust policy: a useful lesson from the history of economic thought for those IO economists who still claim that the classical dynamic view of competition is unsuited as a foundation for an effective competition policy.

Review by Chris Colvin

I will be teaching industrial organisation (IO) to undergraduates next year. It is a brand new course, and so I have been trawling though the websites of IO teachers around the world for inspiration. Overall, I have been quite perplexed with what I have found: undergraduates seem to be fed material that is very theoretical and computational, with little or no context or application. Perhaps this prepares students well for graduate programmes in economics, but the vast majority of economics undergraduates aren’t going to be doing a PhD. And even those that do will require exposure to some empirical research.

I want my students to use their microeconomics, to get them to appreciate that real life is dirtier than in the models. And I want them to understand that economic ideas aren’t fixed in time and space, that a log-run perspective can yield interesting insights about human behaviour. I plan to do so by limiting the use of textbooks and instead delving into academic papers and antitrust cases. I feel economic history should play centre stage in an economics degree, not relegated to an obscure field study. So, when teaching sunk costs and market structure, I will look at the decline of Europe’s film industry in the early twentieth century; when covering collusion, I will set them the US sugar cartel of the 1930s; when teaching natural monopolies, I will examine Victorian railways; and when looking at the efficacy of patents, I will do nineteenth century alternatives.

I am also keen to find something accessible that students can use to appreciate the origins and evolution of competition policy – including why it differs by place, and how legal decisions based on economic arguments made long ago still have resonance today. I want to teach them some history of economic thought. One paper that I hope to discuss in this context is Nicola Giocoli‘s working paper distributed by NEP-HIS on 2012-06-13. Giocoli looks at the reaction in the UK to the advent of antitrust in the US. He finds that influential British economists like Foxwell, McGregor and Marshall were dead against US-style anti-monopoly legislation. They believed it would be difficult to implement, run counter to the ideals of a free market, and be inappropriate in the UK industrial context. The UK had to wait until the 1970s for a pukka competition policy to be introduced.

Alfred Marshall, whose ideas about antitrust policy are explored by Nicola Giocoli

What is particularly interesting about Giocoli’s paper is his description of a transformation in what economists thought competition entailed. For classical economist, competition was about firm conduct; they adopted a dynamic process-based view of competition. For the neoclassical economists that followed, competition was more about market structure, the market condition; this static view was more concerned with business size and the number of competitors. For someone teaching modern IO theory, this is fascinating. Over the last two (or three) decades, IO has seen a paradigm shift from the old structure-conduct-performance view of competition – which primarily concerned itself with measuring market structure – to the so-called New Industrial Organisation view – which, apparently much like the economists described by Giocoli, is far more concerned with figuring out firm conduct and doesn’t necessarily draw a causal link between structure and performance. In short, it appears we have come full circle.

I like Giocoli’s paper because he tries to marry his history of economic thought with up-to-date research in economic history. Instead of seeing the US as a success and Britain as a failure – a view that business historian Alfred Chandler made a living out of – Giocoli argues instead that competition law was unnecessary because Britain was largely still a success, still ahead of everyone else terms of total factor productivity – it didn’t require government intervention. I would encourage Giocoli to further develop this argument by looking at some of the work of Leslie Hannah, whose career has been devoted to debunking Chandler. His work (including in the JEH) shows that the Chandlerian corporation was actually far more a thing of Europe than America. A monopolist like Standard Oil – the company whose breakup is central to any history of antitrust – was the exception rather than the rule. US capitalism is a story of small family-run enterprise, not big business. How does this revision of the business history affect Giocoli’s argument?