Author Archives: Manuel A. Bautista-González

About Manuel A. Bautista-González

Mexican economist and financial historian specialized in banking, finance, means of payment, and payment systems.

“A fluid, ever-evolving, and organic process of improvement, misstep and improvement”: The Long Road to Monetary Union in the USA

Politics on the Road to the U. S. Monetary Union

Peter L. Rousseau (peter.l.rousseau@vanderbilt.edu), Vanderbilt University

URL: http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/vanwpaper/vuecon-sub-13-00006.htm

Abstract: Is political unity a necessary condition for a successful monetary union? The early United States seems a leading example of this principle. But the view is misleadingly simple. I review the historical record and uncover signs that the United States did not achieve a stable monetary union, at least if measured by a uniform currency and adequate safeguards against systemic risk, until well after the Civil War and probably not until the founding of the Federal Reserve. Political change and shifting policy positions end up as key factors in shaping the monetary union that did ultimately emerge.

Review by Manuel Bautista Gonzalez

Peter L. Rousseau

Peter L. Rousseau

In this piece published in NEP-HIS 2013-04-13, Peter Rousseau argues for the need to complicate the widely-held, simplistic view that political union is a necessary condition for a successful monetary union. By studying the intersection of politics, money and finance in the United States from the American Revolution to the Great Depression, Rousseau posits that there is no automatic mechanism to ensure the concurrence of political and monetary union.

Although Rousseau begins his paper with a rather narrow definition of monetary union as a “system with a uniform currency and adequate safeguards against systemic risk” (Rousseau 2013: 1), he expands it throughout the paper to take into account other characteristics and consequences of processes of monetary unification.

The most obvious element of monetary union is the adoption of a single unit of account and uniform currency throughout a territory. To function, monetary union requires credible authorities with effective powers to control the supply of money while properly backing liabilities to minimize uncertainty. To reduce transactions costs, monetary union also demands institutional arrangements between the government and the banking system as a private supplier of means of payment. With monetary union, short-term and long-term capital markets become part of a payments system, whereby due to network effects, the reduction of borrowing costs in regular conditions can meet rapidly-spreading liquidity squeezes in times of financial distress. To recapitulate, monetary union has a dual, difficult nature, for it requires the virtuous alignment of public and private interests; henceforth, politics will mold for better or for worse the actual operation of any monetary union.

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“If they couldn’t guarantee the property rights of the land they gave away, how could they possibly sell it?”. Land Privatization and Property Rights in the Nineteenth Century Neo-Europes

The Political Economy of Land Privatization in Argentina and Australia, 1810-1850: A Puzzle

Alan Dye (adye@barnard.edu), Barnard College, Columbia University

Sumner La Croix (lacroix@hawaii.edu), University of Hawai’i-Mānoa

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hai:wpaper:201207&r=his

Abstract: This paper compares public land privatization in New South Wales and the Province of Buenos Aires,in the early nineteenth century. Both claimed frontier lands as public lands for raising revenue. New South Wales failed to enforce its claim. Property rights originated as de facto squatters’ claims, which government subsequently accommodated and enforced as de jure property rights. In Buenos Aires, by contrast, original transfers of public lands were specified de jure by government. The paper develops a model that explains these differences as a consequence of violence and the relative cost of enforcement of government claims to public land.

Review by Manuel Bautista Gonzalez

The U.S. economy has racked up an enviable record of two centuries of sustained economic growth —an achievement, it has often been asserted, that was predicated on the establishment of institutions guaranteeing the security of property rights. My aim in this article has been to qualify this assertion by reminding scholars that economic development also requires that societies be able flexibly to reallocate property rights in response to new technological and other developments. If such reallocations could always occur smoothly—either through market transactions or a consensus effort on the part of society to capture the resulting gains in efficiency—there would be nothing mysterious about this qualification. As I have shown, however, reallocations in the United States have often been involuntary, and losers have not always received adequate (or any) compensation. Owners whose property has been taken from them have routinely charged that property rights are in fact not secure, but aside from some relatively brief episodes when broader protest movements have taken up their cause, these kinds of complaints have never become general. Hence the mystery. Despite the many involuntary reallocations of property that have occurred repeatedly since the formation of the republic, Americans still strongly believe that their property rights are secure and they act in their economic lives accordingly. – Lamoreaux (2011), emphasis added.

This paper was first distributed by NEP-HIS on 2012-05-15. The paper reviewed in this post was a more recent version from January 4, 2013, made available by the authors.

Alan Dye

Alan Dye

Sumner La Croix

Sumner La Croix

Dye and La Croix’s paper is an illuminating exploration of the history of land property rights in the province of Buenos Aires (Argentina) and the colony of New South Wales (Australia) in the first half of the nineteenth century. Whereas Australian squatters acquired de facto claims over lands outside the official settlement areas defined by colonial authorities and some of them managed to transform their claims into de jure property rights, porteño landholders often relied on the will of the authorities of the nascent republic to enforce de jure property rights, with mixed results. Why did authorities honor or not existing claims over land when governments stood to lose revenues from their sale or lease?

In their answer, the authors refute the presentist bias of popular institutionalist and factor-endowment accounts: contrary to the belief, developed countries have not always had a better record of securing and enforcing property rights over land than developing countries. Why?

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“Amalgam of currencies.” A Framework to Understand Chinese Monetary History, 1800-1949

Money and Monetary System in China in the 19th-20th Century: An Overview
Debin Ma (d.ma1@lse.ac.uk), Department of Economic History, London School of Economics (Great Britain)

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:wpaper:41940&r=his

Abstract: This article provides an historical overview on the development of Chinese money and monetary regimes between about 1800 and 1950. It develops a simple conceptual framework based on the relative costs of assessing the inherent value of the currencies of different denomination. Based on this framework, I develop a historical narrative that ties important political and institutional changes with the evolving structural changes in the Chinese monetary regime marked by the vicissitudes in the use of copper, silver currencies and paper money in both the private and public financial sectors from the Opium War in mid-19th century to the end of the Civil War in the 1950s.

Review by Manuel Bautista González

Silver 8-reales of the Mexican Republic with Chinese chopmarks, made in Mexico and circulated in China. British Museum, CM 1920-9-7-343, Room 68: Money.

China was the first country to have coins, or the first along with Lydia in Asia Minor; the first to have paper currency, free banking (competitive issue of notes), and a government monopoly of paper currency; perhaps the first to have a kind of currency board (circa 1270); and a pioneer in some fairly sophisticated forms of exchange control. – Schuler (2012).

This paper, distributed by NEP-HIS on 2012-02-27, offers both a conceptual framework (based on politics and geography) and a historical overview of monies/money and the monetary system of China. As was the case in most of the world, diversity and concurrence of several monies prevailed in the Chinese monetary system well until the 20th century. A bimetallic, commodity standard prevailed, with silver bars named tael (or liang) as the main reference unit, convertible with a “fixed” price in official copper money, and copper cash coins strung together named tiao (or chuan), whose value fluctuated across regions, time and trades. Spanish American silver dollars also circulated widely (with chops of local assayers) since the 16th century (see an example above).

Imaginary units of account, denominated in either silver bars, copper cash or silver dollars were the effectual anchors of the system. The most successful units of account, the Kuping tael and the Haikwan tael, were used for the payment of direct and custom taxes across the empire, but even those standards were challenged across the territory. Currencies were traded with a “nearly infinite set of cross exchange rates” (Ma 2012, 5).

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“If credence is given to colonial writers.” Revisiting the Colonial Money Puzzle

Chronic Specie Scarcity and Efficient Barter: The Problem of Maintaining an Outside Money Supply in British Colonial America

Farley Grubb (grubbf@udel.edu), University of Delaware (United States)

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dlw:wpaper:12-08.&r=his

Abstract: Colonial Americans complained that gold and silver coins (specie) were chronically scarce. These coins could be acquired only through importation. Given unrestricted trade in specie, market arbitrage should have eliminated chronic scarcity. A model of efficient barter and local inside money is developed to show how chronic specie scarcity in colonial America could prevail despite unrestricted specie-market arbitrage, thus justifying colonial complaints. The creation of inside fiat paper monies by colonial governments was a welfare-enhancing response to preexisting chronic specie scarcity, not the cause of that scarcity.

Review by: Manuel Bautista González

Farley Grubb

“Assuming money rather than explaining it allows economists to do money-price-output analysis without caveats” – Grubb 2012: 22

This paper distributed in NEP-HIS 2012-05-22 embeds institutional, regulatory and market constraints within a transactions cost model to account for the chronic specie scarcity affecting British colonial America. In so doing, Grubb offers interesting insights on how to tackle problems in the history of commodity money systems.

The model offered in this paper is part of Grubb’s project to assess what has been called “the colonial money puzzle”, a heated scholarly controversy on the applicability of the quantity theory of money in explaining monetary phenomena in colonial America.

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“Nobody said it would be easy, and nobody was right.” On the (Im)possibilities of International Policy Coordination

International Policy Coordination: The Long View

Barry Eichengreen (eichengr@econ.berkeley.edu), University of California at Berkeley (United States)

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17665&r=his

Abstract: This paper places current efforts at international economic policy coordination in historical perspective. It argues that successful cooperation is most likely in four sets of circumstances. First, when it centers on technical issues. Second, when cooperation is institutionalized – when procedures and precedents create presumptions about the appropriate conduct of policy and reduce the transactions costs of reaching an agreement. Third, when it is concerned with preserving an existing set of policies and behaviors (when it is concerned with preserving a policy regime). Fourth, when it occurs in the context of broad comity among nations. These points are elaborated through a review of 150 years of historical experience and then used to assess the scope for cooperative responses to the current economic crisis.

Review by: Manuel Bautista González

“The question is whether those who talk the talk also walk the walk.” (Eichengreen 2011: 1)

Barry Eichengreen

Financial turmoil in the European Union has been increasing in the last months. According to The Economist, credit in the eurozone is tighter than it was in the worst months after the Lehman bankruptcy. “Forget about a rescue in the form of the G20, the G8, the G7, a new European Union Treasury, the issue of Eurobonds, a large scale debt mutualization scheme, or any other bedtime story. We are each on our own”, wrote Simon Johnson and Peter Boone earlier this week (Johnson and Boone 2012). Paul Krugman has brought attention to the horrific consequences of the defeat of the European monetary experiment: “Failure of the euro would amount to a huge defeat for the broader European project, the attempt to bring peace, prosperity and democracy to a continent with a terrible history. It would also have much the same effect that the failure of austerity is having in Greece, discrediting the political mainstream and empowering extremists” (Krugman 2012).

It is in this context that this paper written by Barry Eichengreen and distributed by NEP-HIS on 2012-01-03 is an opportune “breathless historical review” (Eichengreen 2011: 29) of past attempts of international policy coordination in monetary, fiscal and financial matters from the last quarter of the nineteenth century to our days. In so doing, Eichengreen provides an interesting narrative centered in politics and institutions that complements optimally a reading of his classical work on the history of the international monetary system and global capital markets (Eichengreen 2008) as well as his most recent account of the US dollar as a dominant international currency (Eichengreen 2011b).

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